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Article
Paying for Water in California: The Legal
Framework*
Brian Gray, Dean Misczynski, Ellen Hanak, Andrew Fahlund, Jay
Lund, David Mitchell, and James Nachbaur**
Over the past four decades, California voters passed a series of initiatives that
amended the California Constitution to limit the power of the state legislature and
local governments to enact taxes and restrict their authority to adopt fees and other
charges to fund government programs. Three of these initiatives—Proposition 13
(enacted in 1978), Proposition 218 (passed in 1996), and Proposition 26 (approved in
2010)—have placed significant constraints on the funding of water resources projects.
Although each of these laws has enhanced the transparency and accountability of the
decision-making process, the funding constraints now jeopardize an array of vital
water supply, management, and regulatory functions. These include funding for the
development of new water supplies, integrated water management, protection of
groundwater resources, development of alternative water sources (including recycled
and conserved water programs), control of stormwater discharges, and regulation of
water extraction and water use to protect water rights, water quality, aquatic species,
and other beneficial uses of the state’s water systems.
This Article is a companion to the report Paying for Water in California and focuses
on the legal aspects of water financing. The Paying for Water study demonstrated the

* This Article originally appeared as an online appendix to Paying for Water in California
(Public Policy Institute of California 2014), by Ellen Hanak, Brian Gray, Jay Lund, David Mitchell,
Caitrin Chappelle, Andrew Fahlund, Katrina Jessoe, Josué Medellín-Azuara, Dean Misczynski, James
Nachbaur, and Robyn Suddeth. It was supported by generous funding from the S.D. Bechtel, Jr.
Foundation and the California Water Foundation, an initiative of the Resources Legacy Fund.
** Brian Gray is Professor of Law, University of California, Hastings College of the Law. Dean
Misczynski is Adjunct Fellow, Public Policy Institute of California. Ellen Hanak is Senior Fellow,
Public Policy Institute of California. Andrew Fahlund is Deputy Director, California Water
Foundation. Jay Lund is the Ray B. Krone Professor of Environmental Engineering, University of
California, Davis. David Mitchell is a principal at M. Cubed. James Nachbaur is American Association
for the Advancement of Science Policy Fellow.
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critical importance of local funding to support California’s water system: local
utilities and governments raise eighty-five percent of the more than thirty billion
dollars spent annually on water supply, quality, flood, and ecosystem management
through local fees and taxes. The study identified a two to three billion dollar annual
funding gap, with critical gaps already evident for provision of safe drinking water in
small, rural communities, prevention of stormwater pollution, protection of people,
property, and infrastructure from flooding, recovery efforts for aquatic ecosystems,
and integrated water management. In most cases, these gaps reflect legal obstacles to
raising more funds locally. In addition, urban water and wastewater systems—now in
relatively good fiscal health—face looming challenges related to rising costs and legal
constraints on the ability to raise fees to support modern, integrated water
management.
This Article begins with an overview of the traditional sources of funding for water
development, management, and regulation, and proceeds to a detailed analysis of the
effects of the constitutional constraints (especially of Propositions 218 and 26) on
these essential governmental programs. Topics include: (i) analysis of the effects of
Proposition 218 on water rates and fees charged by public retail water agencies for
water service and integrated, portfolio-based water management; (ii) consideration of
the special problems of Proposition 218 for groundwater regulation and stormwater
discharge programs; (iii) predictions about the effects of Proposition 26 on wholesale
water rates, water stewardship charges, and regulatory fees; and (iv) suggestions for
harmonizing the fiscal strictures of Propositions 218 and 26 with the reasonable use
mandates of Article X, Section 2, of the California Constitution, which form the
foundation of the state’s water law and policy.
Our key conclusions are that: (1) Propositions 218 and 26 have created significant
impediments to economically rational and sustainable funding of California’s most
important water service, management, and regulatory programs; (2) judicial
interpretations of the constitutional restrictions generally have compounded these
impediments; and (3) reform of the law is needed. The Article concludes with
recommendations that water agencies, the legislature, the courts, and the voters
should consider as a means of correcting (or at least ameliorating) those aspects of
the law that are inconsistent with sound and creative water resources administration.
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Better is it that thou shouldest not vow, than that thou shouldest vow
and not pay.
—Ecclesiastes 5:5 (King James).

The development and management of water resources is vital to
California’s economic and social well-being.1 This water service includes
a variety of interrelated activities:
 Supplying water for drinking and household purposes,
commercial and industrial uses, agriculture, landscaping, firefighting,
and other beneficial uses;

1. This Article is a companion to the report Paying for Water in California and focuses on the
legal aspects of water financing. Ellen Hanak et al., Pub. Policy Inst. of Cal., Paying for Water in
California (2014) [hereinafter Paying for Water].
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 Developing new sources, including imported, recycled, and
desalinated water and water purchased through transfers;
 Managing surface water impoundment, transportation,
distribution, and use;
 Promoting conservation and efficient use to reduce demands on
freshwater sources;
 Managing groundwater by regulating pumping, and
replenishing groundwater supplies and protecting aquifers from
overdraft, saltwater intrusion, and pollution from surface sources;
 Managing stormwater and stormwater discharges though
collection of surface runoff, treatment of sewage, reduction of debris,
and protection of surface permeability;
 Managing floodwaters through levees, channelization,
catchment basins, and protection of wetlands;
 Regulating water rights and resolving disputes over water use;
 Protecting water quality through regulation of water rights,
discharges, and land use;
 Protecting aquatic ecosystems that both provide essential
habitat for fish and wildlife and serve as the sources of the state’s
developed water supplies.

These functions often overlap. For example, stormwater that is
collected and allowed to percolate into managed groundwater basins can
augment water supplies. Discharges of treated sewage and polluted
runoff may harm water quality, but also may be blended with other
surface water and groundwater supplies to serve industrial and
agricultural users. Regulation of groundwater withdrawals may be
necessary to ensure the achievement of overall water service by allowing
for coordinated (or “conjunctive”) management of surface and
groundwater supplies. Protection of aquatic ecosystems is necessary, not
only to comply with the federal and state Endangered Species Acts, but
also to allow for sustainable and reliable diversions to supply water to
households, farms, and non-farm businesses. Indeed, integrated and
conjunctive management of surface and groundwater resources is a
hallmark of contemporary water resources policy.2
An array of governmental structures and financing arrangements
pays for these water services.3 The state and federal governments
provide water on a large scale through the State Water Project and
Central Valley Project, and also build and maintain various flood works.
Cities and counties provide water supply and groundwater management,
2. See Ellen Hanak et al., Pub. Policy Inst. of Cal., Managing California’s Water: From
Conflict to Reconciliation 253–313 (2011) [hereinafter Managing California’s Water].
3. Private water purveyors also play an important role, supplying approximately twenty percent
of California’s urban (non-farm) water demand. Because this Article focuses on the legal context for
raising funds by public agencies, we discuss the investor-owned utilities only in passing. The California
Public Utilities Commission regulates the rates charged by these utilities.
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as well as sewer, stormwater, and other water-related services. Many
different kinds of special districts also provide water supply, sewage
treatment, stormwater management, flood protection, groundwater
replenishment, and other water-related services within their geographic
boundaries. Joint powers authorities, consisting of ad hoc assortments of
cities, counties, and districts, have been formed to facilitate integrated
water services or to achieve economies of scale. Federal, state, and local
agencies also regulate the tens of thousands of water diverters,
dischargers, and land users whose actions may adversely affect
California’s water resources.
These diverse water service providers, water managers, and
regulatory agencies have developed a variety of methods to pay for their
services.4 For example:
 The state has authorized $19.6 billion in general obligation
(“GO”) bonds since 2000 to provide grants and other contributions to
fund water projects.5 These bonds are repaid from state general fund
revenues, mostly from income and sales taxes paid by people and
corporations in California. The state also pays some of the costs of the
Department of Water Resources, the State Water Resources Control
Board, the Department of Fish and Wildlife, and other state agencies
that manage water resources, either with state general revenues or
sometimes with revenues from fees. 6
 The federal government covers part of the cost of the Central
Valley Project by charging water service rates. It also pays for some of
California’s flood control investments, as well as for water quality,
wetlands, and fisheries protection through agencies such as the Army
Corps of Engineers, the Environmental Protection Agency, the U.S.
Fish and Wildlife Service, and the National Marine Fisheries Service.7
 Most of the costs of providing water in California are paid with
funds raised by cities, counties, and special districts. Each relies on
some or all of the following basic income sources: 8
o Property taxes. Owners of real property pay an annual tax
of approximately one percent of the value of their property at the
time of its purchase. Before passage of Proposition 13 in 1978, cities,
counties, and districts were allowed to levy property tax percentage
rates to fund their operations; and the combined property tax
percentage was usually considerably higher than the current one
percent. Revenue from the one percent rate is divided among cities,
counties, school districts, and other special districts, including those
that provide water services.9

4. See infra Table 1 for a summary of expenditures on various components of California’s water
system by local, state, and federal agencies.
5. See Paying for Water, supra note 1, app. C at 5.
6. See id. at app. C for details on bond spending and repayment.
7. See id. app. B at 3–4 tbl.B1.
8. See Paying for Water, supra note 1, at app. C for details on local revenues.
9. See id. at 19.
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o Other general revenue. Cities and counties have other
general fund revenue sources, which can be used for any lawful
purpose, including water service and administration. The sales tax is
the most important “other” general revenue source, followed by
taxes on business licenses, utility users, and tourists.10
o Water fees. Local agencies also levy fees for water services.
For example, most homeowners and businesses receive a monthly
water bill (which usually combines a flat monthly rate and a charge
for metered use, and sometimes includes rate tiers that increase with
the amounts of water used). Water bills also frequently include
charges for sewer service (often based on the volume of water used).
Agricultural users may pay similar fees. Cities, counties, and other
local water supply agencies may levy a standby charge for water
service that is available but not used, such as for a plot on which a
house has not yet been built. Some impose fees to discourage excess
pumping and to acquire water to recharge groundwater basins that
contribute to overall water service.11
o Special assessments and taxes. Many local agencies also levy
special parcel assessments and parcel taxes for water services (often
for flood control and in some cases for stormwater programs).
Assessments are supposed to be proportional to the special benefit
received by each parcel for the specific services provided, whereas
parcel taxes can be used for any voter-approved purposes. These
charges are usually included on property tax bills.12
 The costs of water resources regulation are paid by tax revenues
or fees. For example, the State Water Resources Control Board
(“SWRCB”) and the California Department of Fish and Wildlife
obtain some revenues through permit fees, and some local
groundwater management agencies in California collect fees from
groundwater users to manage the aquifers. 13

I. Constitutional Complications
Nearly all of these revenue sources have been constrained, or at
least complicated, by a series of amendments to California’s Constitution
approved by the state’s voters, beginning in 1978 with the landmark
Proposition 13, followed by Proposition 218 in 1996 and Proposition 26 in
2010. Judicial interpretations have clarified many aspects of these laws,
often in ways that further complicate the funding of water management
and administration. Yet, there remain significant unanswered legal
questions, and water agencies, property owners, and water users continue
to grapple with the complexities and uncertainties of the constitutional
constraints on the sources of funding for water service and water
10. Mac Taylor, Cal. Legislative Analyst’s Office, Cal Facts 27 (2013).
11. Ellen Hanak et al., Funding Sustainable Groundwater Management in California, California
Water Blog (Apr. 3, 2014), http://californiawaterblog.com/2014/04/03/funding-sustainable-groundwatermanagement-in-california.
12. Paying for Water, supra note 1, at 16; see infra Box 2.
13. Hanak, supra note 11.

L - Gray_20 (E. Goldberg).doc (Do Not Delete)

8/17/2014 4:58 PM

PAYING FOR WATER IN CALIFORNIA

August 2014]

1609

resources regulation. As a guide to this discussion, Table 1 summarizes
the key changes in water-related finance resulting from these reforms.
Table 1: Impacts of Propositions 13, 218, and 26 on State and Local
Revenue Rules
Pre-1978

State

Taxes

Prop. 218 (1996)

14

2/3 of legislature



Prop. 26 (2010)


Regulatory
fees

50%of legislature

50%of legislature

50%of legislature

Stricter
requirements
(more likely a tax)

GO bonds

50%of state voters

50%of state voters

50%of state voters

50%of state voters

General
taxes

Flexible15

Flexible

Simple majority for cities
and counties, not available
to special districts

GO bonds16

2/3 of local voters

2/3 of local voters

2/3 of local voters

Special
taxes

Undefined

2/3 of local voters





Flexible

1%
of purchase price
+2%
annual
increases17







Property
taxes

Local

50%of legislature

Prop. 13 (1978)


2/3 of local voters

Propertyrelated fees
and
assessments

Flexible

Flexible

1) All water-related
services: Strict cost-ofservice requirements
2) All water-related
services: Property owner
protest hearing
3) Floods and stormwater:
50%
of property owners or
2/3 popular vote

Nonpropertyrelated fees

Flexible

Flexible

Flexible

Stricter
requirements
(more likely a tax)

Wholesale
fees

Flexible

Flexible

Flexible18

Stricter
cost-of-service
requirements

14. Bold text in the columns under the propositions shows the changes resulting from each
constitutional reform.
15. “Flexible” typically means that rate decisions could be made by governing boards. Before
Proposition 218, there was variation in voting requirements for different types of general taxes.
16. In 2000, voters passed Proposition 39, which lowered this vote threshold to fifty-five percent
for school bonds. See generally Proposition 39: Text of Proposed Law, California Ballot Pamphlet:
General Election Nov. 7, 2000 at 73.
17. Property taxes may be increased for GO bonds with two-thirds local voter approval (or fiftyfive percent for schools). Cal. Const. art. XVI, § 18.
18. As described infra Part II.A, water wholesale agencies have assumed that they are exempt
from Proposition 218 because they do not deliver services directly to properties, but this issue has not
been decided by the courts.
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A. Proposition 13 (Enacted June 6, 1978)
California’s most famous tax initiative, Proposition 13, arose as a
protest against the rapid increases in property taxes that accompanied
California’s booming real estate markets in the 1960s and 1970s. It
limited the property tax that local governments may levy to one percent
of each parcel’s estimated value, and it provided that local governments
could increase the assessed (that is, taxable) value of each parcel by no
more than two percent annually.19 This change immediately reduced
local property tax revenue by more than five billion dollars, or slightly
over fifty percent.20 Previously, cities, counties, school districts, and other
local agencies—including water, sewer, and flood control districts—
levied their own property tax rates, usually without voter approval. The
revenue from the one percent levy is divided among these agencies, more
or less in proportion to each agency’s pre-Proposition 13 share of
revenues. Many water-related agencies continue to receive this money.21
Proposition 13 also changed the approval process for other taxes. It
required that all changes in state taxes be approved by a two-thirds vote
of the legislature,22 and introduced a new requirement that local special
taxes be approved by two-thirds of local voters.23
B. Proposition 218 (Enacted November 5, 1996)
Many local governments responded to the reduction in revenues
caused by Proposition 13 by increasing their use of fees, charges, and
special assessments, including those for water services. Some special
districts levied non-property-related “general” taxes (which were not
addressed by Proposition 13) after approval by a majority of their local
voters, especially for transportation purposes.24
Proposition 218 amended the California Constitution to restrain
many of these local government practices.25 Among other changes, the
law:

19. Cal. Const. art. XIIIA, §§ 1–2.
20. Cal. Bd. of Equalization, Pub. 29, California Property Tax: An Overview 1 (2012).
21. See Paying for Water, supra note 1, app. B at 6 tbl.B3 for recent property tax revenues of
water-related special districts in California.
22. Cal. Const. art. XIIIA.
23. Id. art. XIIIA, § 4; as described infra, Proposition 26 amended the language of this limitation,
but it did not alter the two-thirds majority requirement.
24. See generally CaliforniaCityFinance.com, Local Countywide Transportation Sales Taxes (2010).
25. Cal. Const. art. XIIIC. Indeed, the law included a finding that “Proposition 13 was intended
to provide effective tax relief and to require voter approval of tax increases. However, local
governments have subjected taxpayers to excessive tax, assessment, fee and charge increases that not
only frustrate the purposes of voter approval for tax increases, but also threaten the economic security
of all Californians and the California economy itself.” Proposition 218: Text of Proposed Law,
California Ballot Pamphlet: General Election Nov. 5, 1996 at 108. Proposition 218 then declared
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 Clarifies that local general taxes always require majority voter
approval and local special taxes require approval by a two-thirds vote
of the local electorate.26
 Prohibits special districts from levying general taxes. 27
 Makes it more difficult to levy special benefit parcel
assessments, which were sometimes used to fund water supply and
flood protection projects and other water programs.28
 Places the burden of proof on local agencies to demonstrate
that assessments are proportional to the special benefit that each
parcel receives from the facility or service.29
 Requires that proposed assessments be approved through an
election in which votes are weighted by the amount of assessment each
parcel owner would have to pay.30

Before the enactment of Proposition 218, the courts largely
accepted local agency determinations that the fees, assessments, and
other charges that they levied on property within their jurisdiction
benefitted from the charges in a manner fairly proportionate to their
share of the services funded by the charge.31 Proposition 218 now
requires local agencies to prove that they have complied with the
substantive standards of the law, including the requirement that each
parcel benefit in proportion to the share of the assessment levied against
it and that the assessment not exceed the cost of the property-related
service provided to each parcel.32 Many local agencies have found it
difficult to satisfy these criteria.33
In addition, Proposition 218 established new substantive standards
for fees and charges levied “as an incident of property ownership” or for
a “property-related service.”34 The meaning of these standards caused
considerable confusion, with several courts concluding that the law did
not cover water rates and fees because they were charged for water

that its purpose was to protect taxpayers “by limiting the methods by which local governments exact
revenue from taxpayers without their consent.” Id.
26. Cal. Const. art. XIIIC, § 2, cl. b, d. “‘General tax’ means any tax imposed for general
governmental purposes.” Id. § 1, cl. a. Cities, counties, and other local entities that exercise general
governmental powers may levy general taxes with approval by a majority of the electorate. Id. § 2,
cl. b. Special purpose districts and agencies do not have authority to levy general taxes. Id. § 2, cl. a.
“‘Special tax’ means any tax imposed for specific purposes, including a tax imposed for specific
purposes, which is placed into a general fund.” Id. § 1, cl. d. As noted in the text, special taxes require
approval of two-thirds of the electorate. Id. § 2, cl. d.
27. Id. § 2, cl. a.
28. Id. art. XIIID, § 4.
29. Id. § 4, cl. f.
30. Id. § 4, cl. g.
31. Dawson v. Town of Los Altos Hills, 547 P.2d 1377, 1382–83 (Cal. 1976).
32. Cal. Const. art. XIIID, § 4.
33. Silicon Valley Taxpayers Ass’n v. Santa Clara Cnty. Open Space Auth., 187 P.3d 37, 55–56
(Cal. 2008); Town of Tiburon v. Bonander, 103 Cal. Rptr. 3d 485, 508–09 (Cal. Ct. App. 2009).
34. Cal. Const. art. XIIID, §§ 3, 4, 6.
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service to property rather than imposed as an incident of property
ownership.35 In two cases, however, the California Supreme Court held
that, except for the initial utility connection, water supply is a “propertyrelated service” and is therefore subject to Proposition 218.36
[O]nce a property owner or resident has paid the connection charges
and has become a customer of a public water agency, all charges for
water delivery incurred thereafter are charges for a property-related
service, whether the charge is calculated on the basis of consumption
or is imposed as a fixed monthly fee. 37

Proposition 218 imposes five substantive standards with which
public retail water agencies must comply before they increase water rates
or fees or make changes in their rate structures. The law states:
A fee or charge shall not be extended, imposed, or increased by any
agency unless it meets all of the following requirements:
1. Revenues derived from the fee or charge shall not exceed the
funds required to provide the property-related service.
2. Revenues derived from the fee or charge shall not be used for
any purpose other than that for which the fee or charge was
imposed.
3. The amount of a fee or charge imposed upon any parcel or
person as an incident of property ownership shall not exceed the
proportional cost of the service attributable to the parcel.
4. No fee or charge may be imposed for a service unless that
service is actually used by, or immediately available to, the
owner of the property in question. Fees or charges based on
potential or future use of a service are not permitted. . . .
5. No fee or charge may be imposed for general governmental
services . . . where the service is available to the public at large in
substantially the same manner as it is to property owners. 38

If an affected property owner challenges a fee or charge in court, the
agency has the burden of proving that it has complied with these
requirements.39
Proposition 218 also created two procedural requirements that
public retail water agencies must fulfill before they may adopt a
property-related fee or charge. First, the agency must conduct a public
hearing on the proposed change in rates, fees, or rate structure.40 “If
written protests against the proposed fee or charge are presented by a
majority of owners of the identified parcels, the agency shall not impose
35. Howard Jarvis Taxpayers Ass’n v. City of Los Angeles, 101 Cal. Rptr. 2d 905, 907–08 (Cal. Ct.
App. 2000).
36. Bighorn-Desert View Water Agency v. Verjil, 138 P.3d 220, 225 (Cal. 2006); Richmond v.
Shasta Comm. Svcs. Dist., 83 P.3d 518, 528 (Cal. 2004).
37. Verjil, 138 P.3d at 227.
38. Cal. Const. art. XIIID, § 6, cl. b.
39. Id. § 6, cl. b, pt. 5.
40. Id. § 6, cl. a, pt. 2.
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the fee or charge.”41 Second, property-related fees and charges, except
those for “water, sewer, or refuse collection services,” must be approved
by local voters.42
For these elections, the agency has two options. It can seek
approval by a majority of the property owners who would be subject to
the fee or charge, or from two-thirds of the registered voters in the same
area.43 The Proposition 218 election options create an odd and perhaps
unexpected choice. If the agency takes the seemingly easier path of
seeking approval from a majority of the property owners who would be
subject to the fee, it risks being accused of using an “undemocratic”
approval procedure.44 But if the agency believes that it can obtain
approval from two-thirds of local voters, it is likely to ask them to
approve the measure as a special tax rather than as a property-related
fee, because the agency can thereby avoid the Proposition 218
substantive standards and protest requirements. With a few exceptions
not relevant here, assessments, fees, charges, and rates that were enacted
before July 1, 1997 do not have to comply with the procedural and
substantive requirements of Proposition 218.45
Finally, Proposition 218 makes it unlawful for water agencies to use
the proceeds of water rates and other charges for projects and programs
that are unrelated to water service. Before Proposition 218, for example,
it was common for municipal water departments to transfer surplus water
41. Id. The California Court of Appeal recently held that Proposition 218 does not require water
agencies to conduct individual protest hearings and votes for each class of customers or each type of
rate increase. Morgan v. Imperial Irrigation Dist., 167 Cal. Rptr. 3d 687, 698 (Cal. Ct. App. 2014).
Rather, water agencies may conduct a single “omnibus” hearing in which all of its customers vote. Id.
As the court explained:
Given the goals of section 6 [of Proposition 218] to minimize water rates and promote
dialog between rate payers and rate makers, public agencies must be permitted to
reasonably structure their revenues to cover costs and meet customer needs using a rate
setting process that includes notice and hearing requirements sufficient to allow meaningful
public participation, but tolerably administrable and flexible to avoid needless expense and
delay. . . . The individual protest procedure . . . would create an almost unworkable system,
where a minority of voters could frustrate the purposes of section 6.

Id. at 702–03.
42. Cal. Const. art. XIIID, § 6, cl. c.
43. Id.
44. This occurred in Los Angeles County and Contra Costa County elections for stormwater fees.

Unanswered Questions at the Los Angeles County Clean Water, Clean Beaches Protest Hearing ,
Lakewood Accountability Action Group (Jan. 15, 2013), http://www.laag.us/2013/01/unansweredquestions-at-los-angeles.html; Lisa Vorderbrueggen, County Taking Weeks to Determine Results of
Contra Costa Water Fee Election, Contra Costa Times, Apr. 26, 2012, available at
http://www.mercurynews.com/rss/ci_20481576. Property owner ballot measures have had relatively low
pass rates (68%
) as compared with general tax measures mentioning water that require a simple
majority vote of the general public (100%
). They have done no better on average than special tax
measures, including water, that require a two-thirds majority vote of the general public (65%
). Paying
for Water, supra note 1, app. E at 3.
45. Cal. Const. art. XIIID, §§ 5(a), 6(d).

L - Gray_20 (E. Goldberg).doc (Do Not Delete)

1614

HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL

8/17/2014 4:58 PM

[Vol. 65:1603

revenues to the city’s general fund. This practice would now violate the
law’s express directive that “[n]o fee or charge may be imposed for
general governmental services . . . where the service is available to the
public at large in substantially the same manner as it is to property
owners.”46
C. Proposition 26 (Enacted November 2, 2010)
The most recently enacted constitutional amendment in this trilogy
of financing reforms, Proposition 26, applies to both state and local
governments.47 Its stated purpose was to redefine the term “tax” so that
“neither the Legislature nor local governments can circumvent [the
Proposition 13 and 218] restrictions on increasing taxes by simply
defining new or expanded taxes as ‘fees.’”48 Indeed, the law was based on
the “finding” that:
[T]he legislature and local governments have disguised new taxes as
“fees” in order to extract even more revenue from California taxpayers
without having to abide by these constitutional voting requirements.
Fees couched as “regulatory” but which exceed the reasonable costs of
actual regulation or are simply imposed to raise revenue for a new
program and are not part of any licensing or permitting program are
actually taxes and should be subject to the limitations applicable to the
imposition of taxes.49

Proposition 26 amended Proposition 13 by requiring that any
change in state law that “results in any taxpayer paying a higher tax” be
enacted by a two-thirds vote of the legislature.50 This represents an
important change, because previously the legislature—by simple majority
vote—could enact or authorize taxes or fees that were “revenue-neutral”
overall, even if they raised levies on some individuals.51
Local taxes remain subject to the requirements of approval by
majority vote of the electorate for “general taxes” and approval by twothirds of the voters for “special taxes.” But Proposition 26 defines “tax”
broadly to mean “any levy, charge, or exaction of any kind” imposed by
the state or local governments, except:
46. Id. § 6, cl. b, pt. 5; see In re City of San Bernardino, 499 B.R. 776, 789 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. 2013).
47. See generally Proposition 26: Text of Proposed Law, California Ballot Pamphlet: General
Election Nov. 2, 2010.
48. Id. at 114.
49. Id.
50. Cal. Const. art. XIIIA, § 3, cl. a. As defined by Proposition 13, the two-thirds legislative
approval requirement was applicable to “any changes in state taxes enacted for the purpose of
increasing revenues collected pursuant thereto whether by increased rates or changes in methods of
computation.” Id. § 3, cl. a (amended 2010). The new supermajority vote requirement of Proposition
26 was a response to several statutes by which the legislature increased taxes for some people and
lowered them for others, with an overall “revenue neutral” effect designed to avoid Proposition 13’s
two-thirds vote requirement. Id.
51. Proposition 26: Text of Proposed Law, supra note 47, at 114.
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1. A charge imposed for a specific benefit conferred or privilege
granted directly to the payor that is not provided to those not charged,
and which does not exceed the reasonable costs to the State [or local
government] of conferring the benefit or granting the privilege to the
payor.
2. A charge imposed for a specific government service or product
provided directly to the payor that is not provided to those not
charged, and which does not exceed the reasonable costs to the State
[or local government] of providing the service or product to the payor.
3. A charge imposed for the reasonable regulatory costs to the State
[or local government] incident to issuing licenses and permits,
performing investigations, inspections, and audits, enforcing
agricultural marketing orders, and the administrative enforcement and
adjudication thereof.
...
5. A fine, penalty, or other monetary charge imposed by the judicial
branch of government or the State [or a local government], as a result
of a violation of law.52

For local governments, Proposition 26 also excludes from the definition
of tax:
6. A charge imposed as a condition of property development.
7. Assessments and property-related fees imposed in accordance with
the provisions of Article XIII D [that is, Proposition 218].53

In addition, Proposition 26 states that:
The state [or local government] bears the burden of proving by a
preponderance of the evidence that a levy, charge, or other exaction is
not a tax, that the amount is no more than necessary to cover the
reasonable costs of the governmental activity, and that the manner in
which those costs are allocated to a payor bear a fair or reasonable
relationship to the payor’s burdens on, or benefits received from, the
governmental activity.54

Proposition 26 became law on November 2, 2010, and does not apply to
fees and other charges that were in effect on that date. It does apply,
however, to any subsequent changes in existing fees and charges.55
One of the most important unresolved questions under Proposition
26 is whether it includes “regulatory fees” in its definition of taxes.
Regulatory fees are charges levied for the purpose of deterring certain

52.
53.
54.
55.

Cal. Const. art. XIIIA, § 3, cl. b; id. art. XIIIC, § 1, cl. e.
Id. art. XIIIC, § 1, cl. e.
Id. art. XIIIA, § 3, cl. d; id. art. XIIIC, § 1, cl. e.
In addition, Proposition 26 states that:

Any [state tax] adopted after January 1, 2010, but prior to the effective date of this act, that
was not adopted in compliance with [its] requirements . . . is void 12 months after the
effective date of this act unless the tax is reenacted by the Legislature and signed into law by
the Governor in compliance with the [new] requirements.
Cal. Const. art. XIIIA, § 3, cl. c.
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activities (such as the discharge of pollutants or excessive groundwater
pumping) or of requiring land and water users to bear the full costs of
their activities, including external costs (such as loss of wetlands or harm
to endangered species). Before the enactment of Proposition 26, it was
well-settled California law that these types of regulatory fees were valid
(that is, did not have to be enacted as a tax) if they met two criteria: First,
the fee did not “exceed the reasonable cost of providing services
necessary to the activity for which the fee is charged and which are not
levied for unrelated revenue purposes.”56 Second, the fee “was
‘imposed . . . to mitigate the actual or anticipated adverse effects of the
fee payers’ operations.’”57
Although the courts will ultimately have to decide this question, we
believe that Proposition 26 did not overturn this long-standing definition
of regulatory fees. Rather, the new law had a narrower purpose: to
prohibit the enactment of environmental mitigation fees that are
designed to raise funds to compensate victims of past environmental
harm or to remediate existing environmental degradation that stems
from actions and resource management decisions (that is, water and land
use) that have already taken place. These types of broader
environmental mitigation fees may only be enacted as taxes. We reach
this conclusion for several reasons.
First, as noted above, Proposition 26 candidly describes what it
covers and does not cover, prohibiting only those fees that are (1)
“couched as ‘regulatory’ but which exceed the reasonable costs of actual
regulation”; (2) fees that “are simply imposed to raise revenue for a new
program”; and (3) fees that “are not part of any licensing or permitting
program.”58 In contrast, regulatory fees are (as their name connotes)
regulatory in nature—that is, they apply prospectively to activities that
are governed by permitting and licensing requirements and are tailored
to help achieve the goals of deterring potentially harmful activities and of
forcing the individuals or entities who are subject to the fee to pay the
full costs of their activities—including the external costs that they
otherwise would impose upon other land and water users or the general
public. Regulatory fees therefore do not conflict with any of the
articulated purposes of Proposition 26.
Second, Proposition 26 expressly states that a fee is not a tax if it is
“imposed for a specific benefit conferred or privilege granted directly to
the payor” (such as the right to discharge stormwater or to pump
groundwater) and “does not exceed the reasonable costs to the
[government] of conferring the benefit or granting the privilege to the

56. Cal. Farm Bureau Fed’n v. State Water Res. Control Bd., 247 P.3d 112, 126 (Cal. 2011).
57. Id. For more on this case, see infra Box 1.
58. Proposition 26: Text of Proposed Law, supra note 47, at 114.
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payor.”59 The law then explains this latter criterion in more detail, stating
that a fee is not a tax if the government proves that the amount of the fee
“is no more than necessary to cover the reasonable costs of the
governmental activity”—that is, protecting water quality, regulating
stormwater discharges, and managing groundwater resources—and “the
manner in which those costs are allocated to a payor bear a fair or
reasonable relationship to the payor’s burdens on, or benefits received
from, the governmental activity.”60 This language indicates that
Proposition 26 continues to allow the state and local agencies to adopt
fees that are designed to deter activities (such as excessive pumping that
in the aggregate may cause groundwater overdraft), or compel land and
water users to pay for the negative externalities that they impose on
neighboring landowners, downstream water users, or the environment.
That the fee may also raise money to fund the governmental
program does not render it a tax. The California Supreme Court has held
that “if regulation is the primary purpose of [a] fee measure, the mere
fact that the measure also generates revenue does not make the
imposition a tax.”61 Again, Proposition 26 does not alter this principle, as
its “findings and declarations of purpose” states that it was enacted to
address “[f]ees couched as ‘regulatory’ but which exceed the reasonable
costs of actual regulation or are simply imposed to raise revenue for a
new program and are not part of any licensing or permitting program.”62
Proposition 26 does change the substantive law governing
regulatory fees in one significant respect: it prohibits the use of fees that
require resource users to pay for harm that they may have caused by past
activities or for harm caused by others.63 In this respect, the new law
overturns part of the California Supreme Court’s decision in Sinclair
Paint, which upheld the Childhood Lead Poisoning Prevention Act of
1991 against claims that it was a “special tax” that must be approved by a
two-thirds majority of the legislature under Proposition 13. The Act
requires paint manufacturers and others who produce or distribute
products that contain lead to pay a fee to fund medical services for
children who are at risk of lead poisoning.64 It states that the fee shall be
assessed on the basis of each individual contributor’s “past and present
responsibility for environmental lead contamination” and “‘market
share’ responsibility for environmental lead contamination.”65

59. Cal. Const. art. XIIIA, § 3, cl. b, pt. 1; id. art. XIIIC, § 1, cl. e, pt. 1.
60. Id. art. XIIIA, § 3, cl. d; id. art. XIIIC, § 1, cl. e (emphasis added).
61. Sinclair Paint Co. v. State Bd. of Equalization, 937 P.2d 1350, 1358 (Cal. 1997).
62. Proposition 26: Text of Proposed Law, supra note 47, at 114 (emphasis added).
63. Id.
64. Cal. Health & Safety Code § 105310(b)(1)–(2) (West 2014).
65. Id. As noted above, Proposition 26 also changed the burden of proof applicable to judicial
review of regulatory fees. Before Proposition 26, the plaintiffs challenging a fee had “the burden of
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The court concluded that “the police power is broad enough to
include mandatory remedial measures to mitigate the past, present, or
future adverse impact of the fee payer’s operations, at least where, as
here, the measure requires a causal connection or nexus between the
product and its adverse effects.”66 Section 105310 “imposes bona fide
regulatory fees,” the court reasoned, because the statute “requires
manufacturers and other persons whose products have exposed children
to lead contamination to bear a fair share of the cost of mitigating the
adverse health effects their products created in the community. . . . From
the viewpoint of general police power authority,” the court saw “no
reason why statutes or ordinances calling on polluters or producers of
contaminating products to help in mitigation or cleanup efforts should be
deemed less ‘regulatory’ in nature than the initial permit or licensing
programs that allowed them to operate.”67

proof to establish a prima facie case showing that the fee is invalid.” Cal. Farm Bureau Fed’n v. State
Water Res. Control Bd., 247 P.3d 112, 122 (Cal. 2011).
[O]nce plaintiffs have made their prima facie case, the state bears the burden of [producing
evidence] and must show “(1) the estimated costs of the service or regulatory activity, and
(2) the basis for determining the manner in which the costs are apportioned, so that charges
allocated to a payor bear a fair or reasonable relationship to the payor’s burdens on or
benefits from the regulatory activity.”

Id. at 123 (quoting Sinclair Paint, 937 P.2d at 1357). Proposition 26 places the burden of proving
compliance with its substantive standards on the government throughout the litigation. Cal. Const.
art. XIIIA, § 3, cl. d; id. art. XIIIC, § 1. As noted supra, Proposition 218 similarly placed the burden of
proving compliance with its substantive directives on local governments.
66. Sinclair Paint, 937 P.2d at 1356.
67. Id.
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Box 1: State Water Resources Control Board Fee Litigation
The California Supreme Court’s most recent decision on regulatory fees came in California Farm

Bureau Federation v. State Water Resources Control Board, 247 P.3d 112 (Cal. 2011). Since the creation of
the first water rights regulatory system in the Water Commission Act of 1913, the Water Rights Division of
the board (and its predecessor agencies) were supported by the state’s general fund. In 2004, however, the
legislature changed this funding system by enacting Senate Bill 1049, which directed the board to establish a
schedule of annual fees and special application fees that would be charged to all appropriators of surface
water that operate under permit or license issued by the SWRCB. Cal. Water Code §§ 1525–1560 (West
2014). Riparians, pre-1914 appropriators, and pueblo water right holders are exempt from the fees. The fee
schedules are set forth in the SWRCB’s regulations. Cal. Code Regs. tit. 23, §§ 1061–1078 (2014).
The California Farm Bureau Federation and other water users sued, claiming that the annual fees
were a tax that required a two-thirds vote of the legislature. Although Proposition 26 was enacted while the
case was on appeal, none of the parties contended that the fees were subject to the new law, and the
Supreme Court consequently did not address Proposition 26’s substantive standards. The court’s opinion is
nevertheless important because it provides an instructive analysis of how the courts should evaluate
regulatory fees.
The court rejected the claim that the fees are facially unconstitutional. It reasoned that the legislature
had taken care to ensure that the fees would not be classified as a tax that would require a two-thirds
majority vote under Proposition 13 because it did not authorize the Board to use the proceeds of the fees for
activities other than regulation of permittees and licensees: “Section 1525 does not require the SWRCB to
collect anything more than the administrative ‘costs incurred’ in carrying out the functions [covered by the
fees] . . . . Thus, the fees charged . . . are linked to the activities the Division performs.” Cal. Farm Bureau

Fed’n, 247 P.3d at 124–25.
The Supreme Court remanded the case to the superior court, however, for resolution of the question
of whether the Board fairly apportioned the 2003 annual fees among the various fee-payers’ proportion to
their respective burdens on California’s water systems. It emphasized that the superior court should consider
“whether the fees are reasonably related to the total budgeted cost of the Division's ‘activity,’ keeping in
mind that a government agency should be accorded some flexibility in calculating the amount and

distribution of a regulatory fee.” Id. at 126 (emphasis added).
In November 2013, the Sacramento County Superior Court held that the 2003 annual fees violated
these principles. It found that because of the statutory exemption of riparian, pueblo, and pre-1914
appropriative rights, the fees only covered approximately sixty-two percent of surface water right holders.
Yet, the water rights administrative programs funded by the fees benefit all water right holders as well as the
general public. Under these circumstances, the court concluded that the fees “do not provide a fair,
reasonable, and substantially proportionate assessment of all costs related to the regulation of the affected
payors.” The court also ruled that the Board failed to justify the fees charged to the U.S. Bureau of
Reclamation. Judgment, N. Cal. Water Ass’n v. SWRCB, No. 03CS01776 (Cal. Super. Ct. 2013).
Although the superior court correctly decided that the annual water use fees should include all
surface water right holders (not simply permittees and licensees), the court’s conclusion that the fee is
unconstitutional because it funds activities that benefit the general public is inconsistent with the California
Supreme Court’s definition of a valid regulatory fee—one that compels the affected water users to pay for
the external costs of their activities, including the costs of regulation to resolve water rights disputes and to
protect water quality, fish, and other aspects of the environment. We expect that the Board will raise this
issue on appeal.
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This part of the Sinclair Paint holding is no longer good law.
Proposition 26 expressly limits the use of regulatory fees to mitigation of
prospective environmental harm likely to be caused by the payor’s
actions. If enacted today, the Childhood Lead Poisoning Prevention
Act’s collection of a fee to redress harm from past contributions of lead
would therefore have to be passed as a tax by a two-thirds vote of the
legislature.68
California courts will ultimately decide the precise meaning and
consequences of Proposition 26. A careful reading of the stated purposes
and implementing sections of the initiative, however, should lead to the
conclusion that prospective regulatory fees continue to be fees rather
than taxes. Moreover, in the absence of explicit repealing language, the
courts are likely to be wary of the conclusion that the new law completely
eliminates regulatory fees, which are a long-standing and vital feature of
environmental stewardship and regulation. As the U.S. Supreme Court
recently emphasized: “Insisting that landowners internalize the negative
externalities of their conduct is a hallmark of responsible land-use policy,

68. The Legislative Analyst’s explanation of Proposition 26, which was published in the Official
Voter Information Guide, also supports the interpretation that the initiative applies only to fees that
fund remedial projects that are designed to compensate for or mitigate past environmental harm or
that generate revenues that are allocated to unrelated governmental programs. According to the
Legislative Analyst:
Generally, the types of fees and charges that would become taxes under the measure are
ones that government imposes to address health, environmental, or other societal or
economic concerns. Figure 3 provides examples of some regulatory fees that could be
considered taxes, in part or in whole, under the measure. This is because these fees pay for
many services that benefit the public broadly, rather than providing services directly to the
fee payer. The state currently uses these types of regulatory fees to pay for most of its
environmental programs.

Proposition 26: Analysis by the Legislative Analyst, California Ballot Pamphlet: General
Election Nov. 2, 2010 at 58 (emphasis added). In Figure 3, the Legislative Analyst briefly described
three types of fees that could only be enacted as taxes if Proposition 26 were enacted: the Oil
Recycling Fee, the Hazardous Materials Fee, and Fees on retail stores that sell tobacco products. All
three resemble the lead contamination fee at issue in Sinclair Paints. (What would make these fees
unlawful under Proposition 26 is the fact that the proceeds are used for things besides mitigation of
prospective harm that is likely to be caused by the fee-payers’ actions.) The principal argument in
support of Proposition 26 that appeared in the official Voter Information Guide also confirms the
interpretation that enactment of the initiative would not eliminate prospective environmental
mitigation fees. “Don’t be misled by opponents of Proposition 26,” it urged the voters: “California has
some of the strongest environmental and consumer protection laws in the country. Proposition 26
preserves those laws and PROTECTS LEGITIMATE FEES SUCH AS THOSE TO CLEAN UP
ENVIRONMENTAL OR OCEAN DAMAGE, FUND NECESSARY CONSUMER
REGULATIONS, OR PUNISH WRONGDOING . . . .” Proposition 26: Argument in Favor of
Proposition 26, California Ballot Pamphlet: General Election Nov. 2, 2010 at 60. The California
Supreme Court has held that if the text of an initiative is “clear and unambiguous, the plain meaning
governs. But if the language is ambiguous, we consider extrinsic evidence in determining voter intent,
including the Legislative Analyst’s analysis and ballot arguments for and against the initiative.” Silicon
Valley Taxpayers Ass’n v. Santa Clara Cnty. Open Space Auth., 187 P.3d 37, 47 (Cal. 2008) (citations
omitted).
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and we have long sustained such regulations against constitutional
attack.”69

II. Implications of Propositions 218 and 26 for the
Administration of California’s Water Resources
Proposition 218 was enacted almost two decades ago, yet its effects
on water service and water resources management have only lately come
to public attention and debate. As a result of recent judicial
interpretations, the law is likely to alter ratemaking and water
administration in several important ways.
First, public retail water agencies will have to explain more carefully
and clearly the relationship between their water rate structures and the
cost of providing water service to their customers, link new fees and rates
to the projects and programs they are designed to fund, and justify any
differential treatment between or among classes of customers based on
differences in the cost of providing services to those classes. Second, they
will have to justify water service charges that fund water management
activities that may not directly benefit all individual customers, but
rather, provide indirect benefits to customers by reducing either
aggregate demand for freshwater supplies or the aggregate cost of
providing water service. Third, local groundwater and stormwater
management agencies will have to explain how fees that they employ to
address the external costs of their constituents’ water and land use
activities are consistent with Proposition 218’s cost-based allocation
scheme. Indeed, this may be the most challenging issue for agencies that
are subject to the law’s requirements.
Proposition 26 is relatively new. As discussed above, the courts have
not yet had a chance to decide whether it applies to all regulatory fees or
only those that address past environmental harm or provide funds for
unrelated governmental programs. The effects of Proposition 26 on
California water policy therefore remain more speculative. The law may
require public wholesale water agencies—which deliver water to retail
agencies but not to individual businesses and residences—to explain and
justify their fees, charges, rates, and rate structures in a manner similar to
Proposition 218’s directives to retail water agencies.70 This could include
proof of compliance with Proposition 26’s substantive standards—
including evidence that water rates and fees do not exceed the
reasonable costs of the specific service provided, and that rates and rate
structures “bear a fair or reasonable relationship to the payor’s burdens

69. Koontz v. St. Johns River Water Mgmt. Dist., 133 S. Ct. 2586, 2595 (2013).
70. Most wholesale agencies have operated under the assumption that they are not subject to
similar requirements under Proposition 218 because they do not deliver water directly to properties.
Ass’n of Cal. Water Agencies, Proposition 26: Local Agency Guidelines for Compliance 11 (2012).
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on, or benefits received from” the agency.71 The latter requirement may
also make it more difficult for the state or local governments to raise
funds to support environmental cleanup and habitat restoration
programs because of the tighter burden of proof regarding the link
between the fee and the burden caused by specific activities.
In addition, both water agencies and the courts will have to address
the relationship between Propositions 218 and 26—especially as these
laws may apply to water management programs that have some aspects
of water service to property (and to the consumers who inhabit and use
the property), but which are primarily designed to ensure that activities
that take place on such property do not harm neighboring lands, public
waters, or environmental quality. We believe that these types of
regulatory fees are an uneasy fit within Proposition 218 and should be
evaluated only under Proposition 26. There is also the potential for
conflict between the cost-based allocation standards of Proposition 218
and the constitutional cornerstone of California water policy, article X,
section 2, of the state constitution. Overly literal interpretation of the
Proposition 218 standards could undermine a variety of water
conservation and integrated management programs that are key features
of contemporary water resources administration.
The remainder of this Article explores these issues and proposes a
set of constitutional reforms to these laws to enable sustainable funding
of California’s water system. It also suggests a variety of ways that water
agencies, the courts, and the legislature can respond constructively to the
challenges posed by these laws in their current form.
A. Proposition 218 and Retail Water Rates
Proposition 218 has already had significant effects on water rates
and rate structures, and its influence is likely to expand as the courts
continue to explicate its various restrictions and requirements. To date,
these judicial decisions have been limited to retail water service.72 The
law applies only to assessments on real property and to fees and charges
levied “as an incident of property ownership” or for a “property-related
service.”73 Because fees and charges for wholesale water service are paid
by the retail water supplier, they probably are not covered by
Proposition 218.74

71. Cal. Const. art. XIIIA, § 3, cl. d.
72. See, e.g., infra notes 76–77 and accompanying text.
73. Cal. Const. art. XIIID, § 2.
74. The courts have not yet decided this question. It is possible that a court would conclude that
because the combined pricing decisions of retail and wholesale agencies make up the “cost” used to
justify a property-related fee, both retail and wholesale ratemaking are subject to Proposition 218. The
text of Proposition 218, however, does not compel this conclusion. Moreover, the legislature has
declared that changes in wholesale rates that are passed along from a retail water supply agency to its
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Although Proposition 218 expressly exempts “fees or charges
for . . . water . . . services” from its election requirements,75 most water
rates are nonetheless subject to its substantive standards.76 To date, the
California courts have interpreted these standards broadly to require
public retail water agencies—those that provide water service directly to
residential, commercial, and agricultural users—to justify their specific
rates, ratemaking formulas, and rate disparities based on differences in
the cost of providing service to different classes of customers. Two recent
cases are illustrative.77
In City of Palmdale v. Palmdale Water District, the California Court
of Appeal struck down a tiered-rate structure that the Palmdale Water
District (“PWD”) adopted to encourage conservation and efficient use
and reduce demand on its surface and groundwater sources of supply.78
The new rate structure imposed a fixed monthly service charge based on
the size of the customer’s meter and a variable commodity charge that
increased in four tiers based on the level of each customer’s exceeding of
his or her base use allocation.79 The specific rates for each of the four
tiers differed, however, depending on whether the customer’s water use
was for residential, commercial, or irrigation purposes.80
The court concluded that this differential among classes of
customers violated Proposition 218’s third substantive standard—that the
rate charged to individual parcels or customers “shall not exceed the
proportional cost of the service attributable to the parcel”:
[A] review of the tier structure alone establishes that irrigation
customers such as the City are charged disproportionate rates reaching
tier 5 ($5.03/unit) rates at 130 percent of their budgeted allocation as
compared to other users who do not reach such high rates until they
exceed 175 percent (SFR/MFR) or 190 percent (commercial) without

customers are exempt from Proposition 218. See Cal. Gov’t Code § 53756 (West 2014) (“An agency
providing water, wastewater, sewer, or refuse collection service may adopt a schedule of fees or
charges authorizing automatic adjustments that pass through increases in wholesale charges for water,
sewage treatment, or wastewater treatment or adjustments for inflation. . . . ”).
75. Cal. Const. art. XIIID, § 6, cl. c.
76. According to the California Supreme Court, the only such water charges that are categorically
exempt from Proposition 218 are those for new water service connections. See Bighorn-Desert View
Water Agency v. Verjil, 138 P.3d 220, 225–26 (Cal. 2006); Richmond v. Shasta Cmty. Servs. Dist.,
83 P.3d 518, 528 (Cal. 2004).
77. The Palmdale case is a decision by the California Court of Appeal and is binding precedent
on all courts of the state, except for the California Supreme Court. See City of Palmdale v. Palmdale
Water Dist., 131 Cal. Rptr. 3d 373 (Cal. Ct. App. 2011). The Capistrano case was decided by the
Orange County Superior Court, and it has no precedential value. See Statement of Decision
(Proposed), Capistrano Taxpayers Ass’n v. City of San Juan Capistrano, No. 30-2012-00594579 (Cal.
Super. Ct. Aug. 6, 2013) [hereinafter Proposed Capistrano Decision]. The Capistrano decision is likely
to be appealed.
78. Palmdale, 131 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 381.
79. Id. at 376.
80. Id.
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any showing by PWD of a corresponding disparity in the cost of
providing water to these customers at such levels. 81

It also rejected the district’s argument that the differential tieredrate structure was authorized by article X, section 2, of the California
Constitution and sections 370–374 of the Water Code (see infra Box 2)
because the tiered rates were designed to prevent waste and
unreasonable use, and create incentives for conservation and more
efficient use.82 The court did not rule that these laws are irrelevant in a
ratemaking context. Indeed, it emphasized their importance in
promoting efficient water use and management. Rather, the court again
focused on the lack of justification in the record for the disparities among
the classes of customers subject to the differential tiered rates based on
differences in the costs of providing water service to each customer class:
“PWD fails to explain why [these other laws] cannot be harmonized with
Proposition 218 and its mandate for proportionality. PWD fails to
identify any support in the record for the inequality between tiers,
depending on the category of user.”83

Capistrano Taxpayers Association v. City of San Juan Capistrano

was a challenge to the city’s changes to its tiered water rate structure and
adoption of a charge on all residential customers for recycled water that
was made available only to other customers within the city.84 The Orange
County Superior Court ruled that the new tiered rates violated
Proposition 218 because the city “failed to carry its burden of
establishing credible evidence that the rate increases were proportional
to the costs of providing water services to its customers.”85
The court also invalidated the city’s recycled water charge as levied
on residential customers who do not have access to the recycled water.86
It rejected the city’s argument that “it is appropriate to distribute the cost
of recycled water to all ratepayers because they benefit from this practice
in that by supplying recycled water to ratepayers who can use it, this
displaces demand for local potable supplies that can thus be made
available to other customers.”87 The court held that this proffered
81. Id. at 381. SFR represents single-family residences and MFR represents multifamily residences.
82. Id. at 380–81. The legislature enacted sections 370–74 as a means of effectuating article X,
section 2’s water conservation and reasonable use mandates. We discuss these mandates, as well as the
relationship between article X, section 2, and Propositions 218 and 26, in detail below.
83. Palmdale, 131 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 380.
84. Proposed Capistrano Decision, supra note 77.
85. Id. at 3. The city simply added a new water tier to its existing three-tiered structure by holding
Tier 1 constant, increasing that rate by 33.33%to create a new Tier 2, increasing old Tier 2 by 50%to
create a new Tier 3, and increasing old Tier 3 by 83.33%to create a new Tier 4. The court concluded
that these rate increases were illegal because there was no “specific financial cost data in the
[administrative record] to support the substantial rate increases” and the city “failed to identify any
support in the record for the inequality between tiers depending on the category of use.” Id. at 3–4.
86. Id. at 4.
87. Id.

L - Gray_20 (E. Goldberg).doc (Do Not Delete)

August 2014]

PAYING FOR WATER IN CALIFORNIA

8/17/2014 4:58 PM

1625

justification was inconsistent with the third Proposition 218 standard,
which requires that the “service is actually used by, or immediately
available to, the owner of the property in question.”88
These decisions offer several valuable lessons for public retail water
agencies, but they also present significant challenges to sound water
resources management. The state has promoted the expanded use of
recycled water since the early 2000s through grants and regulatory
changes.89 The Department of Water Resources estimates that the use of
recycled water for industrial, agricultural, and landscaping purposes is
likely to rise from about 500,000 acre-feet annually in 2005 to more than
two million acre-feet annually over the next two decades.90 The blending
of treated wastewater is an increasingly important part of groundwater
replenishment in Southern California, and some agencies are now
considering potable reuse as a way to improve water supply reliability.91
In addition, tiered water rates are now a common feature of local retail
water service as the linkage between higher water use and higher
marginal pricing creates incentives for more efficient use and
conservation. “By 2006, roughly half of California’s population lived in a
service area with tiered rates,” and this practice has grown since then, “as
urban utilities have sought to change consumer behavior in response to
drought conditions and restrictions on Delta pumping.”92 Following
encouragement from the California Public Utilities Commission, all ten

88. Id.
89. Several of the state bonds approved in the 2000s made matching funds available for recycled
wastewater development. See Paying for Water, supra note 1, at app. C. More recently, the State
Water Resources Control Board has adopted policies governing recharge groundwater basins with
recycled water. See Cal. State Water Res. Control Bd., Resolution No. 2013-0003, Adoption of an
Amendment to the Policy for Water Quality Control for Recycled Water Concerning
Monitoring
Requirements
for
Constituents
of
Emerging
Concern
(2013),
http://www.waterboards.ca.gov/board_decisions/adopted_orders/resolutions/2013/rs2013_0003.pdf;
Cal. State Water Res. Control Bd., Resolution No. 2009-0011, Adoption of a Policy for Water
Quality Control for Recycled Water (2009), http://www.waterboards.ca.gov/board_decisions/
adopted_orders/resolutions/2009/rs2009_0011.pdf [hereinafter Quality Control for Recycled
Water]. In addition, Governor Brown recently signed Senate Bill 322 (October 8, 2013), which directs
the California Department of Public Health to develop uniform water recycling criteria for direct
potable reuse. S.B. 322, 2013–14 Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2013) (enacted).
90. Quality Control for Recycled Water, supra note 89.
91. Water agencies in Orange and Los Angeles Counties infiltrate tertiary-treated wastewater
into local aquifers. See Orange Cnty. Water Dist., Groundwater Replenishment System,
http://www.gwrsystem.com/images/stories/AboutGWRS/GWRS%
20Technical%
20Brochure.pdfs;
Recycled Water, W. Basin Mun. Water Dist., http://www.westbasin.org/water-reliability2020/recycled-water/about-recycled-water (last visited Aug. 1, 2014). The City of San Diego is
considering blending highly treated wastewater into its potable water supplies. City of San Diego Pub.
Utils. Dep’t, Long-Range Planning & Water Res. Div., Fact Sheet: Water Purification
Demonstration Project (2013), http://www.sandiego.gov/water/pdf/waterreuse/prdemo.pdf.
92. Managing California’s Water, supra note 2, at 270.

L - Gray_20 (E. Goldberg).doc (Do Not Delete)

HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL

1626

8/17/2014 4:58 PM

[Vol. 65:1603

large investor-owned water utilities adopted tiered rate structures in the
late 2000s as a means of promoting conservation.93
Box 2: Allocation-Based Conservation Water Pricing
(California Water Code §§ 370–374)
In 2008, the California Legislature expressly authorized public water supply agencies to use
“allocation-based conservation water pricing.” Under this type of pricing system, the water rate includes:
 A basic (or base) charge per volumetric unit of water service. The amount of water
covered by the basic charge may vary by customer class or by individual water service connection.
The factors that an agency may use to determine each customer’s (or class of customers’) basic
allocation may include “the number of occupants, the type or classification of use, the size of lot or
irrigated area, and the local climate data for the billing period.” Id. § 371(b).
 A conservation charge per volumetric unit of water service that is in excess of the basic
charge. The agency can choose to have one or more conservation charges. The increment between
the basic charge and the conservation charges (and the increments between ascending
conservation charges) may be fixed or variable; they also may ascend in uniform or non-uniform
increments. The only legal requirement is that the “volumetric prices for the lowest through the
highest priced increments shall be established in an ascending relationship that is economically
structured to encourage conservation and reduce the inefficient use of water.” Id. § 372(a)(4).
The legislature thus granted public water suppliers significant discretion to enact tiered water
rates. Consistent with Proposition 218, the law does state that “[r]evenues derived from allocation-based
conservation water pricing shall not exceed the reasonable cost of water service including basic costs and
incremental costs.” Id. § 373(a). It also provides that the rates charged to individual customers or class of
customers shall not exceed the reasonable cost of water service to them individually, taking into account
their basic use allocations, meter size, metered volume of water consumed, and the goals of achieving
conservation and efficient use. Id. § 373(b). As noted in the text, the legislature expressly declared that
allocation-based conservation water pricing “is one effective means by which waste or unreasonable use
of water can be prevented and water can be saved in the interest of the people and for the public welfare,
within the contemplation of section 2 of article X of the California Constitution.” Id. § 370(a).
“Allocation-based rate structures have been successful for several Southern California utilities
since the early 1990s, including the City of Los Angeles and the Irvine Ranch Water District.” Managing
California’s Water, supra note 2, at 272. The Eastern Municipal Water District, the Coachella Valley
Water District, and the Rincon del Diablo Water District have also recently adopted allocation-based
conservation pricing. For more information about these rate programs and other types of tiered water
rate structures, see id. at 270–73.
Agencies with allocation-based tiers typically use revenues from the upper tiers to fund
conservation programs within the service area. The Irvine Ranch Water District (“IRWD”) also uses
some of these revenues to capture and treat polluted runoff that results from overwatering of outdoor
landscapes. In Assembly Bill 810, enacted in 2001, the legislature granted IRWD and another Orange
County water supplier, the Santa Margarita Water District, authority to include stormwater management
among its mandates to be able to carry out this program. Cal. Water Code § 35539.10–35539.16 (West
2014). This legislation did not authorize similar activities by other water districts in the state, however.

93. Id. at 273.
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To respond to the judicial decisions on water rate structures—and to
help ensure that the strictures of Proposition 218 do not interfere with
innovative and responsible water management—public retail water
agencies will have to alter their administrative practices in two important
ways. First, water agencies will have to explain their ratemaking
processes and decisions in a relatively simple way that will allow lay
readers—interested members of the public and the judges who will
ultimately review agency decisions—to understand how and why the
agency made the choices that it did. This explanation, of course, will
include the water management studies, economic analyses, cost
accounting, environmental review, and other materials that constitute the
administrative record. But it also must include a narrative explanation
that simplifies these details so that individuals who are not schooled in
engineering, economics, accounting, or other technical disciplines may
understand both the ratemaking process and the agency’s final decision
to adopt a particular fee, charge, or rate structure. To the extent that
Proposition 218 and its judicial interpretations cause greater
transparency in ratemaking, they will serve as positive contributions.
Second, water agencies will have to include in the administrative
record detailed ratemaking studies that explain how proposed new fees,
charges, and rate structures are consistent with the substantive standards
of Proposition 218. Thus, an agency that seeks to create a fee, increase
rates to pay for additional water supplies, or create a new conjunctive use
program will have to prove that the charges do not exceed the capital
and operating costs of the program and that it will use the revenues
exclusively to fund construction and administration of the program. The
agency also will have to prove that the new charges are proportional to
the cost of providing service to each parcel (or class of parcels) and
demonstrate how the program will benefit all of its customers who are
subject to the new charges—for example, by providing greater security
and reliability in water service. In addition, the agency will have to
demonstrate that the charges do not distinguish between or among
customers for reasons other than differences in cost of service. As the
court of appeal held in Palmdale, an agency may not justify a fee or rate
differential between or among classes of customers based on type of
water user or comparative ability to pay.94

94. In its recent decision in Morgan v. Imperial Irrigation District, the California Court of
Appeal explained that the question of whether an agency has adequately explained and justified
increases in water rates based on the cost of service to individual parcels or customer classes is
primarily a question of fact and that the trial courts must uphold the rates if they are supported by
substantial evidence in the administrative record. See generally 167 Cal. Rptr. 3d 687 (Cal. Ct. App.
2014). The court also held that, although Proposition 218 requires the agency to produce reliable data
on water use and cost of service, the law “does not require perfection.” Id. at 708.
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The transparency requirements of Proposition 218 do not, in and of
themselves, require any changes in rate structures. In contrast, the law’s
substantive standards may force public retail water agencies to make
significant changes in how they structure their rates. For example, the
Palmdale court’s rejection of the district’s tiered rate structure—because
it created steeper tiered rates for irrigation and commercial uses than for
residential uses—legitimately calls into question the social utility of
allowing water rate structures (either expressly or inadvertently) to
deviate significantly from the cost of providing the service to which they
are attached.
Public retail water agencies therefore will have to explain why they
charge some classes of customers (such as agricultural users) different
rates than other customers. Lower rates for irrigation supplies (once a
common practice for agricultural customers within water agencies that
serve a diverse customer base) may still be justified based on differences
in cost of service—for example, where agricultural users receive raw
water while residential and commercial customers receive treated water,
or where some lower-priced water is available only on an interruptible
basis. An agency could easily justify such rate distinctions because raw
water does not include the capital and operating costs of treating water
for delivery to domestic customers, and interruptible service requires
fewer capital costs because the agency does not have to build its
infrastructure and water supply portfolio to the same size that it would
have if it had to provide firm supplies to all customers.
The Palmdale decision may also cast doubt on a public retail water
agency’s authority to enact a less expensive “water lifeline” rate for
guaranteed water supplies to low-income customers if the rates charged
to these customers are less than those charged to other residential
customers and the agency cannot explain the rate difference on the basis
of differences in cost of service.95 For example, agencies with a flat water
rate structure—which either charge a fixed monthly fee per connection
or a single volumetric rate for water service that does not increase with
consumption—will have a difficult time justifying the lifeline rate
because there is no cost of service difference between its lifeline
customers and its general customers. In contrast, an agency that has

95. The argument against enactment of Proposition 218, set forth in the Official Voter
Information Guide, stated that the initiative could eliminate lifeline utility support for seniors and
disabled citizens. Proposition 218: Argument Against Proposition 218, California Ballot Pamphlet:
General Election Nov. 5, 1996 at 77. Proponents of the initiative responded that “‘[l]ifeline’ rates for
elderly and disabled for telephone, gas, and electric services are NOT affected.” Proposition 218:
Rebuttal to Argument Against Proposition 218, California Ballot Pamphlet: General Election
Nov. 5, 1996 at 77. They did not mention lifeline rates for water service. We are not aware of any
Proposition 218 challenges to lifeline programs to date, but they are potentially vulnerable under the
current law.
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tiered water rates could justify the rate difference by having a low base
(that is, “lifeline”) rate that applies to all customers regardless of their
income. (As noted above, however, these agencies may face Proposition
218 challenges in establishing the higher tiers for increased levels of
water use if they cannot be justified by the costs of service.) The only
unambiguously lawful way to provide lifeline services is to use other preexisting revenue sources—such as property tax proceeds—to pay for
subsidized lifeline rates or to enact a new special tax (with a two-thirds
supermajority of local voter support) to fund the lifeline program.
In addition to these changes in ratemaking and expenditure, the
substantive standards of Proposition 218 may create significant
difficulties for public retail water agencies that seek to diversify their
water supply portfolios if the courts interpret them literally without
regard to the realities of contemporary water resources management.
The Capistrano case provides a useful illustration.
The superior court struck down the recycled water charge because it
applied to all of the city’s customers, while only some had access to the
recycled water itself.96 Yet, the city offered a persuasive justification for
the system-wide charge: the provision of recycled water to some
customers (predominately irrigation users) reduces aggregate demand
for more expensive imported potable supplies.97 All customers therefore
benefit from the recycled water charge because this enables the city: (1)
to reduce its reliance on an increasingly unreliable source (imported
Delta and Colorado River water supplied by the Metropolitan Water
District through the Municipal Water District of Orange County); (2) to
lower system-wide water rates; (3) to reduce its ocean discharges of
treated wastewater; and (4) to enhance the reliability of its overall water
supply portfolio.
The court’s rejection of this justification for the recycled water
charge—on the basis that it violates the Proposition 218 requirement that
the water service “is actually used by, or immediately available to, the
owner of the property in question”—ignores the realities of
contemporary integrated water resources management in which multiple
sources (including native surface supplies, imported water, groundwater,
recycled water, and in some cases desalinated water) constitute the
agency’s water supply portfolio.98 Indeed, if the Capistrano analysis were
followed by other courts, the result would be a balkanization of water
rates that would force agencies to “dis-integrate” the rates they charge to

96. Proposed Capistrano Decision, supra note 77.
97. Recycled water is not yet available for direct potable use in California and therefore must be supplied
through a parallel plumbing system for non-potable uses (e.g., irrigation and some industrial purposes).
98. Proposed Capistrano Decision, supra note 77, at 4.
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individual customers for integrated water service whenever some
customers have different access to different sources of water.
Fortunately, the California Court of Appeal recently issued a
countervailing (and controlling) interpretation of Proposition 218.
Griffith v. Pajaro Valley Water Management Agency addressed the
legality of that agency’s groundwater augmentation charge in light of
Proposition 218’s substantive standards, and is therefore analyzed in
Part II.D.99 For now, we simply note that the court of appeal in Griffith
took a dramatically different view of water service than the superior
court in Capistrano, recognizing that water service is an integrated
activity in which agencies draw from a portfolio of sources that include
surface water, groundwater, recycled water, stormwater, and water
conservation and other demand reduction programs.100 If other courts
adopt this more realistic understanding, then they will avoid applications
of Proposition 218 that risk stifling creative and prudent contemporary
water resources management.
B. Proposition 26 and Wholesale Water Rates
Wholesale water agencies are important components of California’s
water delivery system. The State Water Project is a wholesale agency
that delivers water from the Feather River and the Sacramento-San
Joaquin River Delta to twenty-nine public agencies in the Sacramento
Valley, the Bay Area, the Central Valley, the Central Coast, and
Southern California.101 The Metropolitan Water District of Southern
California (“MWD”) supplies State Water Project and Colorado River
water acquired from the U.S. Bureau of Reclamation to twenty-six
agencies that serve nineteen million customers throughout Southern
California.102 The San Diego County Water Authority (“SDCWA”)
provides wholesale water service to twenty-four member agencies in San
Diego County.103 The San Francisco Public Utilities Commission supplies
water from the Tuolumne River system and local sources to twentyseven cities and other retail water purveyors.104 The Kern County Water

99. See generally Griffith v. Pajaro Valley Water Mgmt. Agency, 163 Cal. Rptr. 3d 243 (Cal. Ct.
App. 2013).
100. See id. at 251–52.
101. California State Water Project Overview, Cal. Dep’t of Water Res.,
http://www.water.ca.gov/swp (last modified Aug. 11, 2010).
102. Metro. Water Dist. of S. Cal., The District at a Glance 1 (2014),
http://www.mwdh2o.com/mwdh2o/pages/news/at_a_glance/mwd.pdf
103. FAQ and Key Facts, San Diego Cnty. Water Auth., http://www.sdcwa.org/frequently-askedquestions-and-key-facts (last visited Aug. 1, 2014).
104. Water: Overview, San Francisco Water Power Sewer, http://www.sfwater.org/index.aspx?page=355
(last visited Aug. 1, 2014). The number twenty-seven includes the city of San Francisco as a customer.
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Agency delivers water to thirteen predominantly agricultural water
districts.105 Other wholesale suppliers are located around California.106
Proposition 26 may affect wholesale ratemaking and wholesale
water rates. In contrast to Proposition 218, Proposition 26 applies to all
levies and charges—not just those imposed by local government agencies
as an incident of property ownership or for a property-related service—
and it defines these charges as taxes unless they fall within a specific
statutory exemption. Those exemptions include “[a] charge imposed for
a specific government service . . . provided directly to the payor that is
not provided to those not charged, and which does not exceed the
reasonable costs to the State [or local government] of providing the
service.”107
Although this language probably does not allow retail customers to
challenge wholesale water rates (because wholesale water service, by
definition, is not “provided directly to” the retail ratepayer), it may allow
retail water agencies who purchase directly from the wholesaler to claim
that a fee or charge is unlawful because it exceeds the reasonable costs of
providing the wholesale water service. Wholesale agencies have
countered that Proposition 26 applies only to levies and charges that are
“imposed” by government agencies. In the usual cases where wholesale
water rates are negotiated rather than imposed, they argue, Proposition
26 does not apply.
These interpretations of Proposition 26 are being tested in ongoing
litigation between SDCWA and MWD. SDCWA alleges inter alia that
the wholesale water rates that MWD adopted for 2013 and 2014 violate
Proposition 26 because the rates exceed the cost of service to
SDCWA.108 San Diego also alleges that MWD failed to demonstrate that
the rates bear a “fair and substantial relationship” to the burdens and
benefits received by each member agency and unlawfully discriminate
against SDCWA.109 Two of these claims are especially relevant to this

105. Member Units, Kern County Water Agency, http://www.kcwa.com/about_kcwa/
districts.shtml (last visited Aug. 1, 2014).
106. The Central Valley Project, which is owned and operated by the U.S. Bureau of Reclamation,
delivers water from the Trinity, Sacramento, and San Joaquin River basins for irrigation and municipal
and industrial uses in the Central Valley and portions of the Bay Area. Central Valley Project,
Bureau of Reclamation, U.S. Dept. of the Interior, http://www.usbr.gov/projects/
Project.jsp?proj_Name=Central+Valley+Project (last modified Mar. 15, 2013). The Bureau supplies
most of this water on a wholesale basis to irrigation districts, water agencies, and cities. The rates for
this water are set by federal law. See Reclamation Reform Act, 43 U.S.C. §§ 390aa–390zz1 (2011);
Central Valley Project Improvement Act, Pub. L. No. 102-575, §§ 3404(c)(3), 3405(a)(1)(C), 3405(d),
3405(f), 3406(c)(1), 3407(c), 106 Stat. 4706 (1992).
107. Cal. Const. art. XIIIA, § 3, cl. b, pt. 2; id. XIIIC, § 1, cl. e, pt. 2.
108. San Diego County Water Authority’s Petition for Writ of Mandate and Complaint for
Determination of Invalidity, Damages, and Declaratory Relief at 19, San Diego Cnty. Water Auth. v.
Metro. Water Dist. of S. Cal., No. 10-510830 (Cal. Super. Ct. June 8, 2012).
109. Id. at 20.
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Article. First, MWD unlawfully defines the “water stewardship rate” that
it charges member agencies as a transportation charge, even though it
funds water conservation and regional water supply development within
the MWD service area.110 Second, the water stewardship rate
overcharges SDCWA because other member agencies receive most of
the benefits of the program.111 For these reasons, SDCWA contends that
MWD’s wholesale water service rates are a special tax, which must be
approved by a two-thirds vote of the voters in MWD’s service area.112
Following a five-day trial on these claims, the San Francisco
Superior Court invalidated MWD’s wholesale water rates. It first held
that Proposition 26 applies because MWD “imposes” its wholesale rates
on its member agencies.113 Although MWD “negotiated” the rates with
its members, SDCWA and the other members had no power to decline
the rates ultimately set by MWD if they wanted to receive or wheel
water.114 The court then concluded that the administrative record did not
establish a valid relationship between the water stewardship rate and the
benefits that MWD provides to its individual member agencies from the
proceeds of the fee.115
The court stated that the water stewardship rate “recovers the costs
of ‘demand management programs,’ and those in turn provide incentives
for recycling, groundwater recovery, desalinization programs, and other
water conservation efforts.”116 It also acknowledged that these programs
benefited all of MWD’s members by reducing demand and allowing
MWD in turn to reduce its purchases of imported water: “The record
shows that at least the primary benefit of these programs is the creation
of new water ‘supply.’”117 The court nonetheless invalidated the water
stewardship rate under Proposition 26 because MWD had failed to
explain why the rate should be charged as a transportation cost: “It is
certainly reasonable to conclude that transportation capacity needs are
reduced when supply needs are reduced, including reductions
attributable to the demand management programs. . . . But the record
does not show correlation between those avoided costs and water
stewardship rates.”118
The superior court’s decision provides a useful illustration of how
Proposition 26 may affect wholesale water rates and ratemaking. The
110. Id. at 3.
111. Id. at 20.
112. Id. at 19–20.
113. Tentative Determination and Proposed Statement of Decision on Rate Setting Challenges at 48,
San Diego Cty. Water Auth. v. Metro. Water Dist. of S. Cal., No. 10-510830 (Cal. Super. Ct. Feb. 25, 2014).
114. Id.
115. Id. at 59–60.
116. Id. at 58.
117. Id. at 58–59.
118. Id. at 60.
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court determined that Proposition 26 applies to wholesale rates, and it
insisted on clarity, transparency, and rigor in wholesale ratemaking
decisions—just as the courts have done in reviewing retail ratemaking
under Proposition 218. If affirmed on appeal, the court’s decision would
require wholesale water providers to justify specific charges on the basis
of cost of service, and probably compel wholesale agencies to explain
differences in rates among their member agencies, as well as the use of
single or common rates where either water service or the cost of such
service may differ among member agencies.
Yet, the court was also mindful that ratemaking is a complex task
involving the allocation of large fixed costs, and that wholesale agencies
must have some discretion to decide how best to fund projects and
programs that are part of their integrated water portfolios. Although it
struck down MWD’s water stewardship rate because it was unjustifiably
tied to water transportation charges, the court’s recognition that all
member agencies benefit from fees that encourage and fund water
conservation, recycling, desalination, and integrated groundwater
management is an especially valuable contribution to our understanding
of Proposition 26.
C. The Special Challenges of Funding Stormwater Management
Proposition 218 has created special challenges for the funding of
stormwater management programs. The courts have held that local
stormwater discharge fees are subject to the law’s voter approval and
other procedural requirements.119 The substantive standards of
Proposition 218 may also require many stormwater discharge fees to be
enacted as “special taxes” that require a two-thirds vote of the
electorate.120
The U.S. Environmental Protection Agency and California’s
Regional Water Quality Control Boards have recently tightened
National Pollution Discharge Elimination System permit standards for
stormwater discharges.121 As a result, many cities and water agencies now
must find ways to fund the necessary expenditures through rate
increases, fees, property assessments, or special taxes. Proposition 218
has restricted most local stormwater agencies’ ability to fund stormwater
management through fees or assessments. Our interviews with
stormwater managers in August and September 2013 revealed that it has
been challenging for agencies to gain the political support needed to gain

119. See Howard Jarvis Taxpayers Ass’n v. City of Salinas, 121 Cal. Rptr. 2d 228 (Cal. Ct. App. 2002).
120. Cal. Const. art. XIIIC, § 2, cl. d.
121. Cal. Reg’l Water Quality Control Bd., San Francisco Bay Region: Municipal Regional
Stormwater NPDES Permit (2011).
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property-owner or general voter approval of new funds to pay for
stormwater programs.122
In Howard Jarvis Taxpayers Association v. City of Salinas, the
California Court of Appeal ruled that the city’s storm drainage fee was a
“property-related” fee that required voter approval under Proposition
218.123 The city had imposed the fee on all parcels based on their
percentage of impervious area—that is, portions of the land with
structures and pavement that prevent or diminish absorption of
precipitation and runoff, and thereby contribute water to the city’s
stormwater system.124 The city proposed to use the proceeds of the fee to
finance improvements to storm and surface water management facilities
as required by state and federal water quality and discharge standards.125
The court rejected the city’s argument that the fee was levied on the
basis of the fee payers’ use of the stormwater system, rather than land
ownership.126 It then invalidated the fee because the city had not
complied with the voter approval requirements of Proposition 218.127
The court also rejected the city’s contention that the stormwater
drainage fee was a fee for water or sewer service under section 6(e) of
Proposition 218 and was thus exempt from the election requirements.128
It reasoned that the voters who enacted the initiative probably
understood the terms “water and sewer service” to embrace only water
supply and removal of waste from homes and businesses and not as a
“program that monitors storm water for pollutants, carries it away, and
discharges it into the nearby creeks, river, and ocean.”129
The Salinas decision thus requires agencies that seek to increase
fees or to impose new charges to pay for capital improvements to
separate stormwater systems—that is, those that only carry stormwater—
to submit the proposed fees and charges to the affected property owners
or voters for approval.130 Municipal public works departments and other

122. See Paying for Water, supra note 1, at 25–28.
123. Howard Jarvis Taxpayers Ass’n, 121 Cal. Rptr.2d at 229.
124. Id.
125. Id.
126. Id. at 230.
127. Id. at 233–34.
128. Id.
129. Id. at 234. The court’s surmise of voter intent is reinforced by the reference in the assessments
section of Proposition 218 to “sewers, water, flood control, [and] drainage systems.” Cal. Const. art.
XIIID, § 5, cl. a. The drafters’ separation of “flood control” and “drainage” from “water” and “sewer”
in this section indicates that they did not intend that the exemption of “fees or charges for sewer [and]
water” from the election requirements of section 6(c) would implicitly incorporate either of the two
primary functions of stormwater management—viz., flood control and drainage.
130. All but two of California’s stormwater systems are separate. San Francisco and Sacramento
have combined systems that carry both treated sewage and stormwater. These combined systems
probably fall within Proposition 218’s election exemption for fees and charges for “water, sewer, or
refuse collection services.” Cal. Const. art. XIIID, § 6, cl. c.
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stormwater management agencies have found it difficult to persuade
property owners within their jurisdiction to vote for fees and assessment
to support new stormwater expenditures.131 Stormwater pollution
programs are designed to mitigate flooding and pollution caused or
exacerbated by land use and other activities. Yet, property owners have
few incentives to approve charges for these services, which do not
directly benefit them or their property in proportion to their share of the
costs of the fee. For these reasons, many independent stormwater
agencies have continued to finance these programs through general fund
revenues and grants.132 As the costs of stormwater management increase
with new pollution prevention mandates, however, the existing funding
pool is becoming increasingly inadequate. In addition to seeking funds
from property owners, alternatives include the enactment of new special
taxes, and state or local regulatory fees.133 Inasmuch as stormwater is
collected and channeled by a variety of sources—including impervious
private land, but also streets and highways and other sources of
pollutants such as litter—multiple funding sources are appropriate.134
Although the Salinas court did not address the substantive
requirements of Proposition 218, these, too, may present obstacles to
131. It appears that only twelve cities or counties have attempted property-owner ballot measures
for stormwater assessments or fees since the enactment of Proposition 218. Measures passed in seven
of these: San Clemente (2002, 2007, 2013), Palo Alto (2005, after a failed attempt in 2003), Rancho
Palos Verdes (2005, then recalled and reduced in 2007), Ross Valley (2007, but later overturned by
lawsuit), Solana Beach (2007), Burlingame (2009), and Santa Clarita (2009). Communities where
elections have failed include: Carmel (2003), Encinitas (2005), Woodland (2007), Stockton (2009), and
Contra Costa County (2012). See Paying for Water, supra note 1, app. E at 44 n.70 (information
provided by SGI Consulting Group). In 2012, Los Angeles County supervisors decided not to proceed
with an election following protests at the rate hearing (the first part of the two-part Proposition 218
election process). As described in Appendix E, some localities have been successful at passing other
types of ballot measures. Notably, in 2004, Los Angeles City voters approved Measure O, a $500
million bond to support stormwater programs, funded by an increment on local property tax bills. As
described in Box 3, infra, San Mateo County voters approved transportation-related charges in 2005
to support stormwater programs by simple majority vote under special authorization from the
legislature. A few communities have passed special taxes focused on stormwater (Ferndale and Corte
Madera in 1997, Santa Monica in 2006, and Santa Cruz in 2008), and nine have passed special taxes or
GO bonds for stormwater management along with local road improvements. Some communities have
also enacted new general taxes that include stormwater among many other functions. See Paying for
Water, supra note 1, app. E at 9 tbl.E1.
132. Expenditures on stormwater and urban runoff management are usually embedded in the
budgets of municipal public works departments, and it is not possible to separately identify the sources
of funding for these activities. See Paying for Water, supra note 1, at app. B. Our discussions with
stormwater managers in August and September 2013 revealed that these programs face serious
funding challenges and are most commonly funded by a combination of general fund resources,
grandfathered (pre-Proposition 218) stormwater charges, and grants. See id. at app. E (providing
examples of successful new revenue measures).
133. As described above, special taxes must be passed by a two-thirds majority vote of local
taxpayers; a majority of the California legislature must approve statewide fees, while local fees require
majority approval by local governing boards. See supra Table 1.
134. See infra Box 3.
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those agencies that choose to fund stormwater improvements through
fees or assessments.135 For example, opponents of a stormwater fee, such
as the one at issue in Salinas, could argue that the amount of the fee
“exceed[s] the proportional cost of the service attributable to the
parcel[s]”136 covered by the charge or that the stormwater service funded
by the fee “is available to the public at large in substantially the same
manner as it is to [the] property owners” who are subject to the fee.137
Similarly, opponents of a stormwater assessment may question whether
the properties subject to the assessment in fact “receive a special benefit
over and above the benefits conferred on the public at large”138 and that
the amount of the assessment “is proportional to, and no greater than,
the benefits conferred on the [assessed] . . . properties.”139
But these substantive standards of Proposition 218 also suggest that
the “fee for services” theory of stormwater financing may be misguided.
Instead, a better way to analyze stormwater discharge fees may be to
view them as regulatory fees that are designed to compel all who
contribute to stormwater collection and channelization to pay their fair
share of the costs of addressing the flooding or pollution problems that
they create or exacerbate. Regulatory fees are now governed by
Proposition 26, and we address the potential benefits of regulatory fees
for stormwater discharges following an analysis of the effects of
Propositions 218 and 26 on groundwater management.

135.
136.
137.
138.
139.

Howard Jarvis Taxpayers Ass’n v. City of Salinas, 121 Cal. Rptr. 2d 228, 228 (Cal. Ct. App. 2002).
Cal. Const. art. XIID, § 6, cl. b, pt. 3.
Id. § 6, cl. b, pt. 5.
Id. § 4, cl. f.

Id.
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Box 3: The San Mateo County Motor Vehicle License Fee and Funding for
Stormwater Management
In the early 1990s, the cities and county governments in San Mateo County decided to place
responsibility for their stormwater programs under the management of the City/County Association of
Governments of San Mateo County (“CCAG”), a joint powers authority with voting representatives
of elected officials from the county and each city government, which has responsibilities for traffic
congestion management and several other functions. In 2004, the California Legislature authorized
CCAG, by a vote of its members representing two-thirds of the county’s population, to enact an
annual four dollars per vehicle registration fee surcharge to fund programs to reduce traffic congestion
and stormwater pollution management from 2005 to 2009. City/Cnty. Ass’n of Gov’ts of San Mateo
Cnty., Final San Mateo County Congestion Management Program 11-1 (2011). Subsequent
legislation extended the surcharge an additional four years. Cal. Gov’t Code § 65089.11–65089.15
(West 2014). One purpose of the law was to fund stormwater regulation and management so as to
enable the San Mateo governments to comply with their regional National Pollution Discharge
Elimination System permit for stormwater discharges under the federal Clean Water Act. The state
law provided, however, that only “stormwater pollution prevention programs that directly address the
negative impact on creeks, streams, bays, and the ocean caused by motor vehicles and the
infrastructure supporting motor vehicle travel are eligible for funding.” Id. § 65089.12(d).
The San Mateo governments enacted the fee in 2005, which was collected by the California
Department of Motor Vehicles. Cal. Veh. Code § 9250.5 (West 2014). During the eight years it was in
effect, the fee raised approximately twenty million dollars, half of which was allocated to stormwater
regulation and management throughout the county. The legislature did not extend its authorization of
the fee beyond January 1, 2013. It did pass a law in 2010, however, that authorized all congestion
management agencies to levy a ten-dollar surcharge on vehicle registrations to support stormwater
and congestion management with a simple majority vote of the public. Cal. Gov’t Code § 65089.20
(West 2014). San Mateo County voters approved this new surcharge in the November 2010 election by
a fifty-five percent majority. Final San Mateo County Congestion Management Program, supra, at
11–7. The surcharge generates about six million dollars annually. Half of the revenues are allocated to
local agencies and are used for stormwater or traffic congestion management. Another twelve percent
goes to CCAG for countywide stormwater programs, while the remainder is assigned to various local
transportation programs (such as mass transit and senior mobility). The San Mateo County motor
vehicle stormwater fee is an important example of integrated management of stormwater, and it
represents an effective way to ensure that road and highway users contribute to the costs of
stormwater discharge prevention. The vehicle license fee does not fully resolve the funding problem,
however, and CCAG is now evaluating a special tax or property-related fee to help fill the gap.

D. Proposition 218 and Groundwater Management
As with stormwater discharges, groundwater management raises
special problems under Proposition 218. Two cases—both involving the
Pajaro Valley groundwater basin, a coastal aquifer in Santa Cruz
Country—illustrate and largely define these challenges.
The legislature created the Pajaro Valley Water Management
Agency in 1984 to address persistent problems of overdraft, welllowering, and seawater intrusion in the coastal reaches of the freshwater
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aquifer.140 The agency responded to these problems by enacting a
“groundwater augmentation charge” on the extraction of groundwater
from the basin.141 One purpose of the charge was to create a financial
disincentive to pump groundwater that, in the aggregate, would exceed
the safe yield.142 A second purpose was to raise funds to support a variety
of conjunctive water management programs that help to prevent
overdraft and saltwater intrusion.143 These include creation of a water
recycling program that treats wastewater for blending into the native
waters of the aquifer, a program to capture stormwater to recharge the
aquifer, and construction of a coastal distribution system to distribute
this blended water to agricultural users along the coast both for direct
water supply and for basin recharge to repel sea water intrusion.144
The first groundwater augmentation charge, adopted in 2002, was
eighty dollars per acre-foot. The agency increased the charge in 2003 to
$120, and again in 2004 to $180 per acre-foot.145 Because it believed that
Proposition 218 did not apply to groundwater extraction fees, the agency
adopted each of these charges without submitting the matter to the
affected property owners and voters as required by that law.146
In Pajaro Valley Water Management Agency v. Amrhein, the
California Court of Appeal held that the groundwater augmentation
charge is a “property-related fee” and therefore is subject to Proposition
218.147 The court had previously concluded that the groundwater
extraction fee was not related to the ownership of property “because it is
imposed not on property owners as such, or even well owners as such,
but on persons extracting groundwater from the basin.”148 This was
unquestionably true, as the fee applied both to groundwater extractors
whose rights are based on their ownership of land overlying the aquifer
and to appropriators whose water rights are based solely on the act of
pumping the groundwater.149 Nevertheless, the court felt constrained, by
the California Supreme Court’s decision in Bighorn-Desert View Water
Agency v. Verjil, to hold that groundwater pumping is an incident of
property ownership and therefore the fee is subject to Proposition 218.150
The court of appeal also noted that “the charge here is not actually
predicated upon the use of water but on its extraction, an activity in some
140.
141.
142.
143.
144.
145.
146.
147.
148.
149.
150.

Pajaro Valley Water Mgmt. Agency v. Amrhein, 59 Cal. Rptr. 3d 484, 486–87 (Cal. Ct. App. 2007).
Id. at 487–89.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 489.
Cal. Const. art. XIIIC.
Amrhein, 59 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 497–98.
Id. at 498.

Id.
Bighorn-Desert View Water Agency v. Verjil, 138 P.3d 220 (Cal. 2006)
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ways more intimately connected with property ownership than is the
mere receipt of delivered water.”151 Because the agency had not
complied with the public notice requirements of Proposition 218, the
court invalidated the groundwater augmentation charge.152
Following the Amrhein decision, the agency repealed the 2003 and
2004 charges and entered into a settlement agreement that paid $1.8
million to the plaintiffs who had brought that lawsuit and related
litigation.153 In 2010, it enacted a new groundwater augmentation charge,
this time attempting to follow the Proposition 218 public notice and
election requirements.154 A group of landowners, many of whom were
plaintiffs in the earlier litigation, sued, claiming inter alia that the
weighted voting procedures adopted by the agency were unlawful and
that the new charges violated the substantive standards of Proposition
218.155
In Griffith v. Pajaro Water Management Agency, the California
Court of Appeal held that, because the groundwater augmentation
charges are “fees for water service,” they are exempt from the voter
approval requirements of Proposition 218.156 More importantly, the court
also rejected the claims that the 2010 groundwater augmentation charge
violated the substantive standards of Proposition 218.157 In contrast to
the Capistrano court’s interpretation of these standards,158 the court of
appeal applied the standards in a way that reflects an understanding of
the realities of contemporary portfolio-based water resources
management.
For example, the court rejected the plaintiffs’ argument that,
because they did not use the blended water produced by the recycled
water program, they could not be charged a groundwater extraction fee
that supported this program.159 The court responded that this argument
“overlooks that ‘the management of the water resources . . . for

151. Amrhein, 59 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 502–03.
152. Id. at 504.
153. Griffith v. Pajaro Valley Water Mgmt. Agency, 163 Cal. Rptr. 3d 243, 249 (Cal. Ct. App. 2013).
154. The Agency held an election in addition to providing public notice, because the earlier case
had not ruled on whether it was providing a water service that would have been exempt from
Proposition 218’s election requirements, only that the service was property-related. The 2010 charge is
comprised of three categories: “$195 per acre-foot for metered wells inside the coastal delivered-water
zone, $162 per acre-foot for metered wells outside the delivered-water zone (primarily municipal,
industrial, and agricultural users), and $156 per acre-foot for unmetered wells (primarily rural
residential).” Id. at 249 n.4. The agency also adopted a $306 per acre-foot charge for water that it
delivered to customers. Id.
155. Id. at 249.
156. Id. at 251; see Cal. Const. art. XIIID, § 6, cl. c. Although, like water and sewer services,
groundwater augmentation charges are subject to the public hearing and notice requirements of the law.
157. Griffith, 163 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 251.
158. See generally Proposed Capistrano Decision, supra note 77.
159. Griffith, 163 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 253–54.
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agricultural, municipal, industrial, and other beneficial uses is in the
public interest’” and that the agency “was created to manage the
resources ‘for the common benefit of all water users.’”160 Additionally, it
“overlooks that the augmentation charge pays for ‘the activities required
to prepare or implement any groundwater management program.’”161
The court also rejected the plaintiffs’ contention that the trifurcated
augmentation charge162 was not sufficiently tailored to the cost of service
to each parcel. It reasoned:
Given that Proposition 218 prescribes no particular method for
apportioning a fee or charge other than the amount shall not exceed
the proportional cost of the service attributable to the parcel,
defendant’s method of grouping similar users together for the same
augmentation rate and charging the users according to usage is a
reasonable way to apportion the cost of service. That there may be
other methods favored by plaintiffs does not render defendant’s
method unconstitutional. Proposition 218 does not require a more
finely calibrated apportion.163

Finally, the court dismissed the plaintiffs’ claim that the
groundwater augmentation charge violated Proposition 218 because its
proceeds benefit everyone who uses water within the agency’s purview,
not simply those who extract groundwater.164 The agency “is not using
money from the augmentation charge for general governmental service,”
the court concluded.165 Rather, “it is using the money to pay for the
water service provided.”166
Griffith brings much-needed realism to the judicial application of
Proposition 218 to water resources management. The court recognized
that water service is a multifaceted and integrated endeavor and that
component activities—such as management of native surface and
groundwater supplies, acquisition of imported water, recycled water
programs, capture of stormwater for recharge, regulation of groundwater
pumping and water use, and addressing threats to water resources from
overdraft, saltwater intrusion, and pollution—cannot be segregated from
one another. As such, it is lawful to charge individual property owners
and water users a share of the costs, regardless of whether they use or
benefit directly from each of them, because it is the aggregate and
integrated portfolio of water supply and demand reduction programs

160.
161.
162.
163.
164.
165.
166.

Id. at 254.
Id. (citation omitted).
Id.
Id. at 255.
Id. at 256.
Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
Id.
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that makes possible the “water service” that the agency provides to each
of its customers.167
The Griffith court correctly recognized that a groundwater
extraction fee system that pays for sustainable conjunctive management
and assigns the costs based on the demands each groundwater user
places on the system by pumping from the aquifer, does not exceed the
proportional cost of integrated water service to any individual user.168
Yet, groundwater extraction charges are really a hybrid of two distinct
types of fees. As in Griffith, they may be fairly characterized as fees for
the costs of the service of effective groundwater management. But the
extraction charges are also regulatory fees designed to protect against
overdraft and to ensure long-term equilibrium in the aquifer by
increasing the cost of groundwater extraction over and above the capital
and electricity costs of the pumping itself. In this respect, the fees are less
charges for water service than they are fees designed to deter individual
actions that in the aggregate harm all users of water from the managed
groundwater basin. It is therefore worth considering groundwater

167. Groundwater management agencies must explain and justify differences in the amount they
charge to different classes of customers. In April 2013, for example, the Santa Barbara County
Superior Court concluded that the United Water Conservation District (“UWCD”) failed to justify
the differences between its groundwater extraction charge for agricultural use and the charge for
municipal and industrial use. Notice of Ruling, at Ex. A, San Buenaventura v. United Water
Conservation Dist., No. VENCI-00401714 (Cal. Super. Ct. May 1, 2013). UWCD manages the surface
water and groundwater resources of the Santa Clara watershed pursuant to a grant of authority from
the legislature. Id. For 2012 to 2013, the district enacted an agricultural extraction charge of $39.75 per
acre-foot and $119.25 per acre-foot for municipal and industrial (M&I) uses in Zone A, and charges of
$18 and $54 respectively in Zone B. Id. The City of San Buenaventura sued, claiming inter alia that
these disparities violate Proposition 218 because the rate ratios are “not in proportion to the relative
cost between agricultural water and M&I water.” Id. The district defended the charges on the ground
that, measured on a cost per parcel basis, agricultural users paid an average of $1,457.78 per parcel,
while M&I users averaged $29.06 per parcel. Id. UWCD also argued that the approximate three-toone ratio between agricultural and M&I charges per acre-foot is authorized by Section 75594 of the
Water Code, which provides that groundwater extraction charges “shall be established at a fixed and
uniform rate for each acre-foot for water other than agricultural water which is not less than three
times nor more than five times the fixed and uniform rate established for agricultural water.” Id.
(quoting Cal. Water Code § 75594 (West 2014)). The superior court concluded that “UWCD’s
differential rate between agricultural water and non-agricultural water was set because of the
requirement of Water Code section 75594 and not because of a determination that the costs relating to
agricultural water as compared with non-agricultural water support that differential.” Id. Indeed, “the
record is remarkable in its lack of factual discussion of the basis for the differential rate. Consequently
the court must conclude that, notwithstanding the statutory requirement of Water Code section 75594,
UWCD has failed in its burden of proving compliance with [Proposition 218].” Id. The superior court
was careful to note that its decision did not mean that “differential rates between agricultural water
and non-agricultural water can never be supported or that rates complying with Water Code section
75594 cannot comply with Proposition 218. This conclusion is only that UWCD . . . has not made the
factual showing necessary to support its differential rates.” Id. The case is awaiting trial on the
appropriate remedies.
168. Griffith, 163 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 254–55.
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extraction fees, along with stormwater discharge fees, under the
related—but conceptually different—rubric of Proposition 26.
E. Proposition 26 and Regulatory Fees
Although Proposition 26 may cover some types of water service
charges,169 a central purpose of the law was to place limits on the state
and local governments’ use of fees that are “couched as ‘regulatory’ but
exceed the reasonable costs of actual regulation or are simply imposed to
raise revenue for a new program and are not part of any licensing or
permitting program.”170 The law declares that these types of fees “are
actually taxes and should be subject to the limitations applicable to the
imposition of taxes.”171
Proposition 26 contains two substantive standards relevant to
stormwater discharge and groundwater extraction fees.172 It states that
the charge is not a tax if it is “imposed for the reasonable regulatory costs
to a local government for issuing licenses and permits, performing
investigations, inspections, and audits, enforcing agricultural marketing
orders, and the administrative enforcement and adjudication thereof.”173
It also states that:
The local [or state] government bears the burden of proving by a
preponderance of the evidence that a levy, charge, or other exaction is
not a tax, that the amount is no more than necessary to cover the
reasonable costs of the governmental activity, and that the manner in

which those costs are allocated to a payor bear a fair or reasonable
relationship to the payor’s burdens on, or benefits received from, the
governmental activity.174

As analyzed in detail above, the last clause indicates that the
proponents of Proposition 26 recognized the longstanding practice of
government agencies charging regulatory fees that help to internalize the
negative externalities imposed on public resources by a variety of uses of
land and water, and that they did not intend to require agencies to enact
such fees as special taxes. In other words, consistent with Proposition 26,
stormwater management agencies may charge landowners and other
members of the public stormwater discharge fees based on their
respective contributions to stormwater collection and surface runoff; and
groundwater replenishment agencies may impose extraction fees for the
purpose of protecting against well-lowering, sea water intrusion, water
quality degradation, and other pernicious effects of overdraft. To the

169.
170.
171.
172.
173.
174.

This includes wholesale water rates. Proposition 26: Text of Proposed Law, supra note 47, at 114.

Id.
Id.
Id. at 115.
Cal. Const. art. XIIIC, § 1, cl. e, pt. 3.
Id. § 1, cl. e (emphasis added).
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extent that the fee charged to the property owner or resource user
represents the costs of preventing or mitigating these adverse effects, the
fee bears a “fair or reasonable” relationship to the burdens that the
property owner or resource user imposes on the government activity of
protecting and managing surface and ground water resources in the
public interest.175
This understanding of stormwater discharge and groundwater
extraction fees does not necessarily mean, however, that these charges
are exempt from the procedural and substantive standards of Proposition
218. Indeed, the courts have held that they are covered by that law.176
But it does suggest that the characterization of these types of charges as
fees for service is too circumscribed and may mislead agencies and
reviewing courts into focusing exclusively on the question of how
precisely the portion of the fee charged to any particular property or user
relates to the cost of service to that parcel or user.
A broader, and more accurate, analysis should look both to the
proportionality of the costs of the governmental service and to the
question of how the fee works to internalize the external costs created by
each property or user. Under such an analysis, a stormwater discharge
fee would be fairly apportioned among property owners and land users
based on their respective contributions to the loss of permeable land
because the construction and paving that reduces overall permeability
concomitantly increases the amount of stormwater runoff that must be
collected, treated, and discharged. Similarly, a groundwater extraction
fee may be fairly allocated on the basis of each groundwater user’s
annual pumping because each extractor contributes to the risk or reality
of overdraft in proportion to that use. An integrated understanding of
Propositions 218 and 26 is therefore essential, not just to harmonize the
two laws, but also to ensure that are implemented in a manner that
comports with the realities of contemporary water resources
management and regulation.
F.

The Relationship Between Proposition 218 and Proposition 26

The idea of addressing stormwater discharge fees, groundwater
extraction charges, and other charges that protect the quality and
sustainable use of California’s water resources as regulatory fees under
Proposition 26, rather than as fees for water service under Proposition
218, raises the question of whether this functional division between the
two laws is constitutional. In other words, what is the relationship

175. Id.
176. See, e.g., Howard Jarvis Taxpayers Ass’n v. City of Salinas, 121 Cal. Rptr. 2d 228, 233–34
(Cal. Ct. App. 2002) (stormwater); Pajaro Valley Water Mgmt. Agency v. Amrhein, 59 Cal. Rptr. 3d
484, 497–98 (Cal. Ct. App. 2007) (groundwater).
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between the two propositions? Can fees for water resources regulation
be governed exclusively by Proposition 26, or must these charges comply
with the procedural and substantive requirements of both laws?
In the Salinas and Amrhein cases, the court of appeal concluded
that stormwater fees and groundwater extraction charges are “propertyrelated fees” and therefore are subject to the voter approval and other
procedural requirements of Proposition 218.177 These holdings
necessarily imply that stormwater discharge fees and groundwater
extraction charges are also governed by the substantive standards of
Proposition 218. Following this precedent, the Griffith court evaluated
the Pajaro Valley groundwater augmentation charge under these
substantive standards. It concluded that, because the revenues produced
by the charge funded water management programs that benefitted all
landowners and groundwater users, the charge complied with the law’s
cost of service-based standards.178 Yet, the court did not address the fact
that the groundwater augmentation charge is also a regulatory fee
designed to create disincentives to pump groundwater that (in the
aggregate) causes overdraft. Nor did it have occasion to consider the
question of whether the proper legal framework for evaluating these
types of regulatory fees should be Proposition 26 rather than Proposition
218.
As described above, the substantive standards of Proposition 218
make little sense in the case of stormwater discharge fees and apply only
awkwardly to groundwater management charges because these charges
are not really fees for a service provided to property. Rather, they are
fees imposed to influence or regulate how property is used in order to
protect the public against harm caused by that use.
The principal purposes of stormwater management—protection
against flooding and reducing water pollution—do not represent the
“cost of the service attributable to the parcel[s]” covered by the
charge.179 Nor do the parcels subject to stormwater discharge fees always
“receive a special benefit over and above the benefits conferred on the
public at large.”180 Rather, the fees are designed to force those who
contribute to the production and channelization of stormwater runoff to
bear their fair share of the societal costs of their actions. Thus, a
comprehensive and inclusive stormwater program would embrace all of
the major sources of polluted runoff, including land uses that reduce
permeability and infiltration capacity and motor vehicles that use roads
and highways from which surface runoff is diverted, channelized, and

177.
178.
179.
180.

Howard Jarvis Taxpayers Ass’n, 121 Cal. Rptr.2d at 229; Amrhein, 59 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 485.
Griffith v. Pajaro Valley Water Mgmt. Agency, 163 Cal. Rptr. 3d 243, 254–55 (Cal. Ct. App. 2013).
Cal. Const. art. XIIID, § 6, cl. b, pt. 3.
Id. § 4, cl. f.
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discharged.181 It could also include other sources, such as producers or
consumers of goods that become street trash and end up in storm drains
(including the fast-food, beverage, and cigarette industries), as well as
important sources of herbicides, pesticides, fertilizers, and other harmful
chemicals.
Groundwater extraction fees have some characteristics of propertyrelated service fees and some features that are regulatory in nature. On
the one hand, they are designed to deter excessive pumping that in the
aggregate lowers the groundwater table. This may be described as a
service provided to the property that is subject to the fee because it
protects each groundwater user’s individual pumping right. Groundwater
extraction fees are also frequently used to purchase imported water to
augment native groundwater supplies and thus benefit all groundwater
users. But groundwater extraction fees are primarily regulatory because
their main purpose is to require each user to pay for the negative
externalities caused by his or her groundwater withdrawals, including the
costs to other users from well-lowering, seawater intrusion, concentration
of pollutants, and in some cases land subsidence.
As with stormwater discharge fees, the groundwater extraction
charges that are designed to capture or “internalize” these external costs
do not necessarily correspond to the cost of the services that the
groundwater management district provides to parcels covered by the
charge. Moreover, it is likely that some groundwater users will benefit
more from the programs funded by the extraction charge than others. In
a coastal aquifer, for example, those who pump groundwater nearer to
the ocean will receive greater benefits from groundwater management
programs that use extraction fees to address the threat of seawater
intrusion than will inland groundwater users.
If stormwater discharge fees and groundwater extraction charges
are best characterized as regulatory fees, rather than charges for
property-related services, the question then becomes: Can the courts
choose to analyze these types of charges exclusively under Proposition
26? We believe that there is a plausible—though far from conclusive—
argument to support this bifurcated approach to the two laws.
Unlike Proposition 218, which covers property-related services
generally, Proposition 26 was enacted specifically to address regulatory
fees—including those that apply to the use of land and water
resources.182 Although there is overlap between the two laws, in cases of
conflict the more specific, later-enacted law should take precedence. And
there are significant conflicts between the two propositions.

181. See supra Box 3.
182. Cal. Const. art. XIIIC; id. art. XIIID.
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The Proposition 218 cost of service-based limitations are
incongruous with regulatory fees, as they require courts to make tenuous
links between the charges designed to influence or deter land and water
use decisions with the costs and benefits of attendant services provided
to the land or water user. In contrast, Proposition 26 applies directly to
regulatory fees, asking whether the fee was “imposed for the reasonable
regulatory costs to a local government for issuing licenses and
permits.”183
Moreover, Proposition 26 focuses on the central purpose of
regulatory fees—internalization of the external costs of land and water
uses on other users and the environment—by requiring that the charges
that are assigned to each user “bear a fair or reasonable relationship to
the payor’s burdens on, or benefits received from, the governmental
activity.”184 In contrast, Proposition 218 requires a nexus between the
charges and the costs of service to each parcel that is subject to the fee.185
A regulatory fee could thus comply with Proposition 26 because it fairly
and reasonably charges each landowner or water user for the burdens
(that is, the external costs) that she creates, but be unlawful under
Proposition 218 because the fee exceeds either the cost of government
services to the landowner or water user or the benefits received by the
landowner from the regulatory program.
Finally, the text of Proposition 26 shows that its drafters (and
perhaps the voters who enacted it) were aware that its new standards
may overlap with those of Proposition 218, and indicates that they
intended that the two laws should be applied separately to avoid conflict.
Proposition 26 excludes from the definition of “taxes” both assessments
and other “property-related fees imposed in accordance with the
provisions of Article XIIID”—that is, Proposition 218.186 This means
that, if a property-related fee is adopted in accordance with Proposition
218, it is exempt from analysis under Proposition 26. It also suggests,
however, that a “property-related fee” that fails under Proposition 218
could nonetheless be a valid fee—as opposed to a tax—under the
different substantive criteria of Proposition 26. While this clause of
Proposition 26 is far from conclusive, the express exemption of valid
Proposition 218 fees from Proposition 26 does support the conclusion
that the drafters and voters did not intend that both laws would apply
simultaneously to the same fees and charges.
Proposition 26 did not expressly modify or repeal any aspect of
Proposition 218. Yet, it is doubtful that its proponents (and the voters

183.
184.
185.
186.

Id. art. XIIIC, § I, cl. e, pt. 3.
Id. § 1, cl. e, pt. 7 (emphasis added).
See id. art. XIIID.
Id. art. XIIIC, § 1, cl. e, pt. 7.
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who approved the initiative) would have intended the older law to
frustrate the newer law’s clear directives. Indeed, as just noted, the text
of Proposition 26 reveals that its proponents did intend to avoid conflict
between the two laws. When confronted with two potentially applicable
laws that are in conflict, the courts should choose the more specific over
the general, the later enacted over the former, and the law that most
accurately addresses the subject matter of the litigation.187 All three
factors would favor a preference for Proposition 26 in cases involving
regulatory fees.
Under this interpretation, the enactment of a stormwater discharge
fee or groundwater extraction charge might be subject to the Proposition
218 voter approval requirements, as held in Salinas and Amrhein, but
governed by the substantive standards of Proposition 26. Although this
may appear to be an odd bifurcation, it would be better than an
interpretation of the two laws that would allow one, Proposition 218, to
override the more specific and germane provisions of the other,
Proposition 26, whenever a “property-related” charge is also a regulatory
fee.
We believe that this reading of the two initiatives is the one that best
harmonizes their purposes and directives. Equally important, it is the
interpretation that is most consonant with modern land and water
management where the control of externalities is an essential means of
ensuring that individual users do not undermine the protection of shared
resources or unfairly shift the costs of their actions onto their neighbors
or the public at large. Whether the courts will agree, however, is a
separate question. For this reason, we suggest several ways to clarify the
relationship between Proposition 218 and 26, either through legislation
or, if necessary, by amending the Constitution.
G. Proposition 26 and Water Stewardship Fees
Proposition 26 also raises interesting questions about the funding of
ecosystem protection and integrated regional water management: Under
what circumstances can these programs be funded by fees and charges on
water use, rather than special taxes? This is an important question
because some local and regional agencies now include environmental
protection and watershed stewardship within their water supply
responsibilities and some regional agencies now collect fees to support
conservation as part of their water service portfolios. Two examples are
illustrative.
The Sonoma County Water Agency (“SCWA”) is a wholesale
agency that supplies water from the Eel and Russian River watersheds to

187. Warne v. Harkness, 387 P.2d 377, 382–83 (Cal. 1963).
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nine cities, in addition to providing sanitation and flood protection
services.188 The “Watershed Planning and Restoration Sub-Charge”
helps fund habitat restoration, dam improvements, and other water
management programs that are needed to comply with the reasonable
and prudent alternatives set forth in the Russian River biological opinion
that protects coho salmon.189 These investments improve water supply
reliability for SCWA and its member agencies because they reduce the
risk that federal and state fisheries agencies may limit the impoundment
and diversion of water to protect the salmon.
These programs include improvement of the Russian River estuary
to facilitate fish passage to and from the ocean, regulation of stream
flows, installation of fish ladders, and riparian habitat improvements on
several tributaries.190 SCWA conducts this watershed protection and
management in cooperation with the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers,
which operates two of the dams in the watershed, and the Mendocino
County Russian River Flood Control and Water Conservation
Improvement District.191 The Watershed Planning and Restoration SubCharge was $81.06 per acre-foot in 2012 and 2013.192
The MWD includes in its wholesale rates a “Water Stewardship
Rate.”193 According to MWD, the purpose of the rate is to “recover[] the
cost of Metropolitan’s financial commitment to conservation, water
recycling, groundwater clean up and other local resource management
programs.”194 MWD adopted the water stewardship rate in 2003.195 It has
increased the rate several times from its original twenty-three dollars per
acre-foot to its current forty-one dollars per acre-foot.196 The water

188. Water Supply, Sonoma Cnty. Water Agency, http://www.scwa.ca.gov/water-supply (last
visited Aug. 1, 2014).
189. The Biological Opinion: Frequently Asked Questions, Sonoma Cnty. Water Agency,
http://www.scwa.ca.gov/files/docs/projects/rrifr/RRIFR%
20-%
20BO%
20FAQs%
20-%
20final%
208-19-13.pdf
(last visited Aug. 1, 2014).
190. See generally U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, San Francisco Dist., Biological Opinion for
Water Supply, Flood Control, and Channel Maintenance (2008), available at
http://www.scwa.ca.gov/files/docs/projects/rrifr/Signed-RussianRiverFinalBO9-24-08.pdf.
191. See generally Memorandum of Understanding Among United States Army Corps of
Engineers, National Marine Fisheries Service, and Sonoma County Water Agency (Dec. 24, 1997),
available at http://www.co.mendocino.ca.us/bos/meetings/MG27371/AS27379/AS27380/AI27475/
DO27508/1.PDF.
192. Sonoma Cnty. Water Agency, Sonoma County Water Agency Rates for Water
Deliveries in FY 12–13 (2012), http://www.scwa.ca.gov/files/docs/finance/1213/2012-2013-Water/18Water.Rates.pdf.
193. Adopted Water Rates and Charges, Metro. Water Dist. of S. Cal.,
http://www.mwdh2o.com/
mwdh2o/pages/finance/finance_03.html (last updated Apr. 19, 2012).
194. Id.
195. Historical Water Rates, Metro. Water Dist. of S. Cal., http://www.mwdh2o.com/mwdh2o/
pages/finance/finance_02.html (last updated Apr. 16, 2012).
196. Id.
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stewardship rate is but one of fifteen component rates for MWD’s
wholesale water service.197
We believe that both types of water stewardship charges are
consistent with Proposition 26’s substantive standards and may be
enacted as a fee rather than a tax. As described above, modern water
service agencies manage their resources as a portfolio that includes
imported water, local surface and groundwater, recycled water,
recovered stormwater, acquisition of transferred water, and programs to
encourage conservation and efficient use.198 The costs of any project that
increases the quantity or reliability of the agency’s water supplies or
decreases demand on the system may be properly charged to all
customers. Water stewardship charges benefit all property and customers
to which the water service is ultimately provided.
There are, of course, limits on the types and amount of water
stewardship fees that an agency may charge. The fee must apply
prospectively to mitigate the harm that the agency’s water supply
functions (and its customers’ water use) may impose on other land and
water users or the environment. As previously discussed, Proposition 26
requires that charges levied to remedy past environmental damages be
enacted as a tax. The aggregate funds collected from the fee may not
exceed the “reasonable costs” of administering the water stewardship
programs funded by the fee.199 The agency must explain how the fee
benefits its customers by enhancing its system-wide water service and
water management objectives.200 And the agency may not use funds
collected from the fee for other projects.201 A water stewardship fee
could not be used to fund recreational uses within the watershed, for
example. But if an agency stays within these legal bounds, it may adopt a
water stewardship fee as part of its overall water service portfolio.
The Sonoma County Watershed Planning and Restoration subcharge may also be justified on two other grounds. It is a regulatory fee
designed to charge water users within the Russian River watershed for
the harm that the impoundment and diversion of water (for their benefit)
inflict on coho salmon—including flow alteration and reduction,
degradation of habitat, and loss of spawning grounds and other

197. See Adopted Water Rates and Charges, supra note 193. The Sonoma County Water Agency
has similar surcharges on its wholesale water sales to fund conservation ($32.85/af in 2012–2013) and
recycled water and local supply programs ($15.99/af). Sonoma Cnty. Water Agency, Sonoma County
Water
Agency
Rates
for
Water
Deliveries
in
FY
12–13
(2012),
http://www.scwa.ca.gov/files/docs/finance/1213/2012-2013-Water/18-Water.Rates.pdf.
198. See supra Part II.D.
199. Cal. Const. art. XIIIC, § 1, cl. e; Tentative Determination and Proposed Statement of
Decision on Rate Setting Challenges, supra note 113, at 58–60.
200. See, e.g., Griffith v. Pajaro Valley Water Mgmt. Agency, 163 Cal. Rptr. 3d 243 (Cal. Ct. App. 2013).
201. Cal. Const. art. XIIIC, § 1, cl. e.
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habitat.202 As such, the costs assigned to water consumers within
SCWA’s service area “bear a fair or reasonable relationship to [each
customer’s] burdens on, or benefits received from, the governmental
activity”—that is, the federal, state, and local efforts to protect the coho
salmon.203 In addition, the charge may be fairly described as a regulatory
mandate because it was adopted to comply with the reasonable and
prudent alternatives of the Russian River biological opinion. Just as
Proposition 26 allows an agency to charge its customers for the required
costs of acquiring and treating water in accordance with the governing
water rights and water quality laws, so too may the agency include in its
water rates a charge for the costs of complying with the Endangered
Species Act.
H. The Relationship Between Article X, Section 2 of the
California Constitution and Propositions 218 and 26
Article X, section 2, of the California Constitution, enacted by
initiative in 1928, is the foundation of California water rights and water
administration.204 It provides, in relevant part, that:
[B]ecause of the conditions prevailing in this State the general welfare
requires that the water resources of the State be put to beneficial use to
the fullest extent of which they are capable, and that the waste or
unreasonable use or unreasonable method of use of water be
prevented, and that the conservation of such waters is to be exercised
with a view to the reasonable and beneficial use thereof in the interest
of the people and for the public welfare. The right to water or to the
use or flow of water in or from any natural stream or water course in
this State is and shall be limited to such water as shall be reasonably
required for the beneficial use to be served, and such right does not
and shall not extend to the waste or unreasonable use or unreasonable
method of use or unreasonable method of diversion of water.205

The California Supreme Court has held that
[R]easonable use of water depends on the circumstances of each case,
[and] such an inquiry cannot be resolved in vacuo isolated from
statewide considerations of transcendent importance. Paramount
among these we see the ever increasing need for the conservation of
water in this state, an inescapable reality of life quite apart from its
express recognition in the 1928 amendment.206

These directives apply to all water rights—surface and groundwater—
and to all agencies that regulate and manage the state’s water
resources.207
202.
203.
204.
205.
206.
207.

The Biological Opinion: Frequently Asked Questions, supra note 189.
Cal. Const. art. XIIC, § 1, cl. e.
Managing California’s Water, supra note 2, at 41.
Cal. Const. art. X § 2.
Joslin v. Marin Mun. Water Dist. 429 P.2d 889, 894 (Cal. 1967).
City of Barstow v. Mojave Water Agency, 5 P.3d 853, 864 (Cal. 2000).
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Article X, section 2, expressly grants the legislature the power to
pass laws in furtherance of its policies.208 Pursuant to this authority, the
legislature has enacted statutes to encourage conservation and efficient
use, to create incentives to use recycled water, meter and report on water
use, promote water transfers, and monitor and report on groundwater
levels.209 It has authorized counties and local agencies to conjunctively
manage surface and groundwater supplies, and has required urban and
agricultural water agencies to adopt best management practices to
promote conservation and efficient use.210 In addition, the legislature has
granted public water agencies authority to use “allocation-based
conservation water pricing,”211 which it identified as “one effective
means by which waste or unreasonable use of water can be prevented
and water can be saved in the interest of the people and for the public
welfare, within the contemplation of section 2 of article X of the
California Constitution.”212
All of these programs require funding—usually from water rates or
fees charged to their beneficiaries. For example, recycling facilities may
be a component of a retail agency’s rate base because the reclaimed
water contributes to the agency’s overall water supplies. Many agencies
acquire water from willing sellers (both on long- and short-term bases),
and the cost of this transferred water is included in the agency’s water
rates. The costs of water use monitoring, conservation incentives, and
conjunctive use programs also are commonly charged to the agencies’
customers as part of the costs of the agency’s water supply and
management portfolio. Until the enactment of Propositions 218 and 26
(and the judicial decisions applying these laws to water service and water
management), the general assignment of the costs of these programs to
water consumers raised no significant constitutional questions. Indeed, as
noted above, these programs were founded on the constitutional
mandate of reasonable use.
Following the enactment of Propositions 218 and 26, however, both
the relationship between the conservation and reasonable use directives
of article X, section 2, and the authority of the state and local agencies to
use fees to support efficient water use and management have become
important open questions. In Palmdale, the court of appeal briefly
considered one facet of this relationship, concluding that the tiered rate
structure adopted by the district—though enacted pursuant to the
allocation-based conservation water pricing authority of Water Code
sections 370–374—nonetheless must comply with the procedural and
208.
209.
210.
211.
212.

Cal. Const. art. X § 2.
Cal. Water Code §§ 460–465, 500–535, 1700–1745.11, 10920–10936 (West 2014).
Id. §§ 10608-08.64, 10610-56, 10750-83.2, 10800-53.
Id. §§ 370–374.
Id. § 370(a); see supra Box 2.
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substantive standards of Proposition 218.213 The court held that
“California Constitution, article X, section 2 is not at odds with article
XIIID [that is, Proposition 218] so long as, for example, conservation is
attained in a manner that ‘shall not exceed the proportional cost of the
service attributable to the parcel.’”214
The Palmdale decision is not necessarily incorrect. The court did not
hold that allocation-based conservation pricing is now unconstitutional.
Rather, it struck down the tiered rate structure because the district failed
to explain why the higher-tiered rates applied to irrigation users at
volumetric consumption levels that were lower than those for residential
and commercial users.215 For the reasons described above, the absence of
a cogent explanation for differential rates is a legitimate basis for
invalidation under Proposition 218.
We are concerned, however, with the Palmdale court’s suggestion
that the conservation and reasonable use mandates of article X, section 2
must conform to the general requirements of Proposition 218. Simply
put, if the courts strictly apply the “cost of service” standards of
Proposition 218, they risk undermining both the essential directives of
article X, section 2 and many of the salutary features of contemporary
California water policy.
Judicial insistence that public water agencies establish a tight fit
between the aggregate costs and benefits of their water supply portfolios
and how they allocate those costs and benefits to individual water users
and property owners would place an impossible burden on the agencies.
In particular, the molecular-level accounting standard articulated by the
superior court in the Capistrano litigation—by which the city must prove
that the water produced by its recycling program be physically available
to all of its customers216—is both unduly burdensome as a matter of
administrative law and unrealistic in the context of modern water
resources management. So, too, would be a standard of judicial review
that required water agencies to prove precisely how responsive different
categories of demand are likely to be to pricing differentials embodied in
a tiered-rate structure.
An exacting standard of judicial review of these types of decisions
under Proposition 218 would also pose a risk of unintended
consequences. For example, the Capistrano court’s invalidation of the
recycled water charge to those customers and landowners who do not
physically receive the recycled water may threaten the city’s ability to
fund its recycled water program. This, in turn, may reduce the quantity

213.
214.
215.
216.

City of Palmdale v. Palmdale Water Dist., 131 Cal. Rptr. 3d 373, 381 (Cal. Ct. App. 2011).

Id.
Id. at 380–81.
Proposed Capistrano Decision, supra note 77, at 5.
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and reliability of the city’s water supplies for all of its customers; or it
may increase the price of water to all customers if the city either needs to
acquire additional imported water to make up for the deficiency or must
extend its water delivery system to allow it to send recycled water
molecules throughout its service area.
In other words, heightened judicial review under the auspices of
Proposition 218 may insert the courts into areas beyond their technical
competency. Moreover, to the extent that judicial applications of
Proposition 218 make it impossible (or unnecessarily expensive) to fund
water management programs that agencies have adopted pursuant to the
statutes described above, the courts risk interfering with the legislature’s
prerogative to enact laws in furtherance of the water conservation and
reasonable use mandates of article X, section 2.
Similarly, continuing judicial applications of Proposition 218’s costbased allocation requirements to fees and charges that effectuate
stormwater management and groundwater administration threaten to
turn these regulatory fees into special taxes that require a two-thirds vote
of the electorate. As discussed above, this would not only conflict with
Proposition 26’s more relevant and realistic standards, but would also
jeopardize regulatory and resource management programs that are now
vital components of water conservation and reasonable use as required
by article X, section 2.
Thus, rather than asking whether article X, section 2 can be
implemented in a manner that fits into the strictures of Proposition 218,
the courts should seek to ensure that their interpretation of Proposition
218 does not undermine the essential purposes of article X, section 2 (see
infra Box 4). An informed and nuanced understanding of modern water
resources administration—and of the complexities of the charges, rates,
and regulatory fees that both fund and effectuate these myriad
programs—will help the courts come to a working accommodation of
these important constitutional laws.
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Box 4: Constitutional Tensions
One important case, Brydon v. East Bay Municipal Utility District, 29 Cal. Rptr. 2d 128 (Cal.
Ct. App. 1994), has addressed the tensions between the constitutional mandate of reasonable use and
the constitutional limits on taxes and fees. Although this decision predates Propositions 218 and 26, it
nonetheless illustrates how the courts should evaluate the relationship between article X, section 2 and
the newer constitutional requirements.
In response to water shortages caused by the 1986–1992 drought, the East Bay Municipal
Utility District adopted a tiered-rate pricing structure for residential water service. The base rate was
$0.91 per unit and increased in three blocks based on each household’s consumption to a top rate of
$3.94 per unit. Id. at 130–32. Customers in the inland portions of the East Bay Municipal Utility
District’s service area (which use relatively large amounts of water) sued, alleging that the tiered rate
structure was a special tax that required approval of a two-thirds majority of the electorate under
Proposition 13. Id. at 132–33. The California Court of Appeal rejected this claim. It held that:
The inclining block rate structure bears none of the indicia of taxation which [Proposition
13] purported to address. The rate structure was not designed to replace property tax
monies lost in consequence of the enactment of [Proposition 13]. The rates were levied
against water consumers in accordance with patterns of usage, and at no cost to taxpayers
generally. The incremental rate was not compulsory to the extent that any consumer had
the option of reducing his or her consumption. (Id. at 137.)
The court also addressed the interplay between article X, section 2 and Proposition 13:
[I]n the present context the constitutional mandate of water conservation . . . is at least as
compelling as the objectives of [Proposition 13]. Indeed, even if [Proposition 13] is
applicable to the instant rate structure . . . shifting the costs of environmental degradation
from the general public to those most responsible is consistent with the objectives of
Proposition 13. The inclining block rate structure is a reasonable reflection of the fact that
it is in part the profligate usage of water which compels the initiation of regulated
conservation measures including those public education programs designed to encourage
conservation. (Id. at 136.)
In 1993, while the litigation was pending, the legislature amended the Water Code to allow
public water agencies to “adopt and enforce a water conservation program to reduce the quantity of
water used by [its customers] for the purpose of conserving the water supplies of the public entity.”
Cal. Water Code § 375(a) (West 2014). It followed up in 2008 by adding sections 370–374 and
expressly authorizing “allocation-based conservation water pricing” described in Box 2, supra.
For the reasons discussed in the text, the courts should interpret Propositions 218 and 26 in such
a way as to effectuate the important reasonable use and conservation mandates of article X, section 2
and these more specific implementing statutes.

III. Recommended Policy Responses and Legal Reforms
Propositions 218 and 26 were enacted for the purpose of limiting the
ability of local agencies (and for Proposition 26, also the state) to use fees
and other charges to raise revenues to pay for general government
programs, rather than support the specific services for which the fee is
charged. These laws also require greater transparency and accountability
whenever governments increase rates and fees for such services. But the
two constitutional amendments have also produced some unfortunate—
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and likely unintended—consequences for the management of water
services that are vital for California’s economy, environment, and
society. To enable the state’s water suppliers and administrators to
continue to provide clean, reliable, and environmentally responsible
water services, the state’s voters should consider amending Propositions
218 and 26 to address these unanticipated (and undesirable) fiscal
constraints. This Part outlines these proposed constitutional
amendments. It begins, however, by describing other actions that water
agencies, courts, and the legislature can take to help ensure that the
strictures of Propositions 218 and 26 do not deter or prohibit sound water
resources administration.
A. Agency Actions
As discussed above, public retail water agencies can and should
improve the administrative records they develop to support proposed
new fees and charges and changes to their rate structures. This will
require greater clarity in the ratemaking process, including a simplified
and accessible narrative explanation to inform the public and guide the
courts on judicial review. Water agencies also must link fee and rate
changes to the new projects and water management programs that they
are designed to fund. In addition, they must provide cost-based
justifications of rates and fees and explain why the allocation of these
charges among customers complies with Proposition 218’s substantive
standard. Proposition 26 is likely to require wholesale agencies to make
similar changes to their ratemaking processes.
Water agencies should take advantage of the significant authority
afforded by article X, section 2 of the California Constitution, sections
370–374 of the Water Code, and other laws to use fees, water rates, and
rate structures to create incentives for water conservation and efficient
use. As the legislature recognized when it enacted section 372, allocationbased tiered water pricing is an “effective means by which waste or
unreasonable use of water can be prevented and water can be saved in
the interest of the people and for the public welfare.”217
Water agencies must take seriously, however, the judicial warnings
that they may not simply assert that tiered rates and water surcharges
will deter waste and profligate use. Although ratemaking is not a precise
science, and agencies should be afforded significant leeway in setting
rates and fees that they believe will create incentives for conservation
and efficient use, agencies must nonetheless explain how their water
pricing decisions are likely to achieve the constitutional and statutory
goals of promoting efficient water management and use.

217. Cal. Water Code § 370(a) (West 2014).
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Stormwater and groundwater management agencies can also
enhance their ability to use fees and charges to pay for the costs of
stormwater discharge, treatment, infiltration, and conjunctive use
programs if they are able to integrate the programs funded by these fees
into their (or another agency’s) water supply system. Where stormwater
is managed and recaptured as part of an agency’s water supply
portfolio—that is, replenishment of groundwater and reuse of treated
stormwater discharges—the portion of the cost of the stormwater
program attributable to that water supply function may be defined as a
cost of water service. The same is true for groundwater extraction fees
that protect against overdraft and help pay for the cost of imported water
that is used to recharge the aquifer for the benefit of all groundwater
users. It is appropriate to charge each user a fee based on actual pumping
because that apportionment reflects both the costs that each user places
on the aquifer and the individual benefits of groundwater replenishment.
Propositions 218 and 26 thus create incentives for combined
stormwater/water supply agencies to account for their stormwater reuse
just as they do for their imported water, local surface and groundwater
supplies, and other water supply functions that constitute their rate
bases. These laws also may create incentives for independent stormwater
or groundwater management agencies to enter into a joint powers
agreement (or perhaps to merge) with a water supply agency so that they
can gain the same benefits of integrated, portfolio-based water
management and financing.
B. The Role of the Courts
The courts can help to ensure that Propositions 218 and 26 do not
impede prudent and creative administration of California’s water
resources systems by developing a more realistic understanding of
integrated water portfolio management. Water service cannot be
segmented by source of supply as in Capistrano, where the court focused
on where the water molecules produced by the city’s recycled water
program flowed in relation to imported water and local groundwater
supplies.218 Rather, as practiced by modern water utilities, water service
is an integrated and unified product.
Thus, the guiding principles for judicial review of system-wide fees
or rates that fund specific water development, management, or
conservation programs should be:
If the program augments the agency’s water supply portfolio, reduces
demand from freshwater sources, enhances water supply reliability,
improves overall water quality, or enables the agency to comply with
environmental and other regulatory requirements, then the costs of the

218. Proposed Capistrano Decision, supra note 77, at 4.
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program may be imposed on all of the agency’s customers, not just on
those customers who have direct access to the water produced or
conserved by the program. The agency shall apportion the costs of the
program based on the proportional cost of aggregate water service
attributable to each customer.

This is essentially the standard of judicial review that the court of
appeal applied in Griffith.219 A similar standard would apply to judicial
review of fees and charges for other types of water management actions
that benefit all customers, such as conjunctive ground and surface water
management, integration of stormwater and water supply operations,
and demand reduction programs, including financial incentives for
improvements in irrigation efficiency, low-water landscaping, plumbing
improvements, and surcharges on excessive use (that is, higher tiers in
tiered-rate systems). Consistent with article X, section 2, the courts
should also give significant deference to water agency decisions designed
to improve overall water management, encourage conservation and
efficient use, and comply with environmental standards and other
regulatory requirements.
Propositions 218 and 26 assign to the government the burden of
proving that fees, charges, and rate structures are consistent with the
law’s substantive standards.220 The Palmdale court held that the purpose
of this provision of Proposition 218 was to grant the courts authority to
apply a “more rigorous standard of review” than that used in other
administrative law cases, and that courts must exercise “independent
judgment” in determining whether fees, charges, and rate structures
comply with Proposition 218.221 This does not mean, however, that the
court must micromanage water ratemaking decisions.
Questions about the need for a particular water management
program and accompanying fee, charge, or water rate needed to fund it
should remain the primary responsibility of the agencies. The proper role
for the courts is to ensure that the agency’s decision to impose a
groundwater augmentation fee or recycled water charge, for example, is
supported by substantial evidence in the administrative record. The
courts should then exercise their “independent judgment” to determine
whether such programs actually serve their stated purposes and benefit

219. See generally Griffith v. Pajaro Valley Water Mgmt. Agency, 163 Cal. Rptr. 3d 243 (Cal. Ct.
App. 2013).
220. Cal. Const. art. XIIID, § 4, cl. f.
221. City of Palmdale v. Palmdale Water Dist., 131 Cal. Rptr. 3d 373, 378 (Cal. Ct. App. 2011). The
Palmdale court based this decision on the California Supreme Court’s interpretation of another
section of Proposition 218 that assigns the burden of proving compliance with the standards governing
assessments. See generally Cal. Const. art. XIIID, § 4, cl. f. The court held that this section requires
the courts to use their “independent judgment” and review agency assessments with a higher level of
scrutiny than they do other types of administrative and local governmental decisions. Silicon Valley
Taxpayers Ass’n v. Santa Clara Cnty. Open Space Auth., 187 P.3d 37, 49 (Cal. 2008).
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all customers—including those that do not themselves use the blended
water in question—by enhancing water supply reliability or lowering
system-wide water rates. But the courts should not require agencies to
demonstrate a precise fit between ends and means—that is, by requiring
the agency to prove that each customer will incur the exact same benefits
and costs from such programs. Any such higher level of judicial scrutiny
would insert the courts into questions of water management that go well
beyond their relative expertise and would place a burden of proof on the
agencies that they could not meet in most cases, as there are always
differences in the costs and benefits of water services that vary even
among similarly situated parcels and customers.
The courts should also carefully consider the relationship between
Propositions 218 and 26, especially as applied to stormwater discharge
fees, groundwater extraction charges, and other regulatory fees. For the
reasons discussed in detail above, we urge the courts to interpret
Proposition 26 as displacing the substantive standards of Proposition 218
in cases of conflict between the two. Finally, the courts should interpret
both of these revenue provisions of the California Constitution in light of
article X, section 2 (the section of the constitution that most specifically
addresses water use and water resources management). The courts must
ensure that their interpretations of Propositions 218 and 26 do not
undermine the essential water conservation and reasonable use directives
of their constitutional counterpart.
C. Legislative Responses
The legislature can play a constructive role in clarifying the
requirements of Propositions 218 and 26 for water management and
regulation, as it did with the Proposition 218 Omnibus Implementation
Act of 1997.222 Although most of this statute addresses assessments,
section 53756 authorizes public retail water agencies (along with
wastewater, sewer, and refuse collection agencies) to “adopt a schedule
of fees or charges authorizing automatic adjustments that pass through
increases in wholesale charges for water” if the agency complies with
four relatively simple criteria.223 This “pass-though” exemption to the
procedural and substantive standards of Proposition 218 has become an
important feature of ratemaking.
To address the challenges presented by Propositions 218 and 26 for
water service rates and rate structures, stormwater and runoff
management funding, and groundwater extraction fees, the legislature
could articulate several unifying principles of water resources

222. Cal. Gov’t Code §§ 53750–53756 (West 2014).
223. Id. § 53756.
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management, regulation, and funding policy that would guide agencies
and reviewing courts. These principles should include:
1. Clarification that water development projects (including
imported water, acquisitions of transferred water, recycled water,
desalinated water, and stormwater capture), conjunctive surface and
ground water management projects, conservation and efficiency
incentive programs, and environmental and regulatory compliance
benefit all parcels and customers served by local public water agencies.
Therefore, the costs of such projects and programs may be assigned to
all parcels and customers within the service area, consistent with
Proposition 218.
2. A declaration that fees and charges designed to regulate a use
of land, water, or other resources for the purpose of creating financial
incentives for conservation or more efficient use, or for the purpose of
ensuring that each property or resource user subject to the fee pays for
the external costs of the regulated activity, are exempt from
Proposition 218’s substantive standards as long as the fee or charge
complies with the substantive standards of Proposition 26.
3. Reiteration that “allocation-based conservation water pricing,”
as authorized by sections 370–374 of the California Water Code, is an
important means of encouraging the efficient use of water consistent
with the prohibition of waste and reasonable use mandate of article X,
section 2, of the California Constitution. This would be accompanied
by a legislative statement of policy that the courts therefore should
give substantial deference to a water agency’s decision to adopt tiered
rates, unit fees, conservation charges, and other economic incentives
that encourage conservation and efficient use. Because these fees,
charges, and rate structures benefit all parcels and customers served by
the agency, they may be applied to all parcels as long as the fees,
charges, and rates do not discriminate among parcels or customers
based on type of water use or other factors not related to cost of
service.
4. Authorization for local water agencies to use revenues from
upper rate tiers to support water conservation programs. As the
legislature has done for the Irvine Ranch Water District and the Santa
Margarita Water District (see supra Box 2), this should include
authority to capture and treat polluted runoff that results from
overwatering.
5. A declaration that water agencies, water regulators, and the
courts should interpret and implement Propositions 218 and 26
consistent with the water conservation and reasonable use mandates of
article X, section 2.

These legislative determinations would not be binding on the courts
because Propositions 218 and 26 were enacted as constitutional
amendments, and the California Supreme Court has made it clear that
the judiciary has final authority to interpret and ensure the proper
implementation of their terms.224 Nevertheless, the legislature’s

224. Silicon Valley, 187 P.3d at 50.
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interpretation of the law should carry significant weight with the courts.
This is especially true for the clarifications and declarations just listed
because each of them addresses the sound management of California’s
water resources and article X, section 2 of the Constitution expressly
grants the legislature authority to pass laws to implement its reasonable
use mandates.225
D. Constitutional Changes
Several of the interpretations and reforms that we recommend may
not be consistent with the terms of Propositions 218 and 26. One
example is our interpretation of Proposition 26 as not changing the law
governing regulatory fees that apply prospectively to deter harmful
activities (such as excessive groundwater pumping that contributes to
overdraft) or that force land and water users to pay for the negative
externalities of their activities. Another is our suggestion that these types
of regulatory fees should be governed only by the substantive standards
of Proposition 26. Even a court that agrees with our conclusion that
Proposition 218 is ill-suited to regulatory fees—and that this
interpretation better harmonizes the two propositions—might be
reluctant to construe one provision of the constitution as taking
precedence over another without clear guidance from the electorate,
which has final authority over these aspects of California’s constitutional
law.
It therefore may be preferable—even necessary—to ask the voters
to amend the constitution to correct the problems created by
Propositions 218 and 26 for effective water resources management.
Indeed, it is doubtful that anyone involved in the sequential enactment of
these two initiatives—the drafters, sponsors, or the voters—carefully
thought through the consequences of these laws for programs such as
tiered water pricing, water recycling, stormwater discharge fees,
conjunctive surface and groundwater management, or lifeline rates for
low-income households. Nor is it likely that any of these groups

225. Cal. Const. art. X, § 2. The legislature may also want to consider making two other changes
to protect the solvency of water agencies in the face of Proposition 218 challenges. First, it would also
be useful for the legislature to enact a statute of limitation on lawsuits brought to challenge increases
in rates, fees, and other charges under Propositions 218 and 26. The 120-day statute of limitations for
judicial challenges to water and sewer connection fees and capacity charges in California Government
Code section 66022 could serve as a model. Second, it would be useful for the legislature to extend to
all public agencies providing water services the provisions in the California Water Code section 31007
that require county water districts (a particular type of special district) to establish fees and charges at
rates sufficient to cover their costs. In Mission Springs Water District v. Verjil, the California Court of
Appeal held that the local electorate “does not have the power . . . by initiative . . . [to] set water rates
so low that they [are] inadequate to pay [the water district’s] costs.” 160 Cal. Rptr. 3d 524, 546 (Cal. Ct.
App. 2013).
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considered the interplay between Propositions 218 and 26 and article X,
section 2.
The following package of amendments would be consistent with the
conclusions of our analysis:226
1. Amend Proposition 218 to allow public water agencies to adopt
fees, charges, and rates that fund water acquisition, water
development, and water resources management programs that benefit
their customers by increasing water supplies, reducing demand, or
otherwise enhancing the reliability of water service—even though not
all customers may receive or have access to the water that is physically
produced or saved by these programs.
2. Amend Proposition 26 to state clearly that prospective
regulatory fees enacted to deter land and water use activities that harm
other resource users or the environment, or that compel land and
water users to internalize the external costs of their actions, may be
enacted as fees (rather than taxes).
3. Amend Proposition 218 to exempt these types of regulatory
fees from its substantive standards, as they would be governed
exclusively by the substantive standards of Proposition 26.
4. Amend Proposition 218 to incorporate the provisions of
Government Code section 53756 by stating that public water agencies
may adopt schedules of fees, charges, or rates that automatically “pass
through increases in wholesale charges for water, sewage treatment, or
wastewater treatment” without being subject to their procedural and
substantive standards.
5. Amend Proposition 218 to exempt “water lifeline rates”—that
is, subsidized rates for low-income customers—from the cost of
service-based standards of that law.
6. Amend Proposition 218 to add stormwater discharge fees to
the list of charges (currently, sewer, water, and refuse collection
services) that are exempt from voter approval requirements.227
7. Amend Propositions 218 and 26 to state that, although the
burden remains on the public water agency to prove that it has
complied with their substantive standards, the reviewing courts must
defer to the agency’s determination of the need for, amount, and
allocation of a rate or fee, and uphold the charge if there is substantial
evidence in the administrative ratemaking record to support the
agency’s decision.
8. Amend Propositions 218 and 26 to state that public water
agencies and reviewing courts shall interpret their provisions in a

226. For the reasons described in Paying for Water, we also recommend that the voters amend
Proposition 13 to allow local special taxes enacted for the purpose of funding water supply, water
service, water management, stormwater management, and ecosystem improvement and management
to be enacted by a simple majority vote of the electorate. See generally Paying for Water, supra note
1. This would be consistent with the voter threshold for the passage of local general taxes and all fiscal
measures that appear on statewide ballots.
227. This change would not be needed if our second and third proposed constitutional
amendments, which would exempt stormwater fees from Proposition 218 altogether, were enacted.
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manner that is consistent with and promotes the water conservation
and reasonable use directives of article X, section 2. This should
include, but not be limited to, a statement that tiered rates and fees
adopted to promote conservation and efficient use are constitutional,
even if they are not strictly apportioned among property owners and
water users on the basis of cost of service.
9. Finally, as discussed above, the central purpose of Propositions
218 and 26 was to ensure that the funds collected from water service
rates, water management charges, and regulatory fees are not used for
unrelated programs or activities. Thus, we also recommend that both
laws be amended to state that neither the legislature nor local
governments have authority to divert the proceeds of these fees and
charges to purposes other than the programs that are the sources of the
fees and charges. This would reinforce Proposition 218’s declaration
that “[n]o fee or charge may be imposed for general governmental
services . . . where the service is available to the public at large in
substantially the same manner as it is to property owners,”228 as well as
Proposition 26’s directive that fees and charges not exceed the amount
“necessary to cover the reasonable costs of the governmental activity”
and that they “bear a fair or reasonable relationship to the payor’s
burdens on, or benefits received from, the governmental activity.”229

Conclusion
The amendments to the California Constitution that began with
Proposition 13 in 1978 and continued with Propositions 218 and 26 have
fundamentally changed water ratemaking, management, financing, and
regulation. These laws were responses to accumulating voter frustration
with the rising costs of land ownership and utility service, as well as with
state and local government decisions that some members of the public
perceived as opaque, unaccountable, and unjustified. Although these
laws have enhanced the transparency and accountability of governmental
decisionmaking, the substantive standards of Propositions 218 and 26
have placed serious constraints on the ability of the state and local
governments to raise funds for essential water supply, watershed
protection, groundwater management, and pollution control programs—
at least through the use of water rates, fees, and other charges.
We have taken a close look at many of these constraints on
ratemaking, water management, and land and water use regulation. We
have also considered the interactions among Propositions 218 and 26, as
well as the effects of these newer laws on some of the most important
statutory and constitutional directives that govern the use and
management of California’s water resources—most notably, the
reasonable use mandates of article X, section 2. Based on our analysis,
we have offered a variety of recommendations for water administrators,

228. Cal. Const. art. XIIID, § 6, cl. b, pt. 5.
229. Id. art. XIIIA, § 3, cl. d; id. art. XIIIC, § 1, cl. d.
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legislators, judges, and the voting public to address some of the
constraints and misunderstandings of these important initiatives. We
hope that some of our legal analyses and recommendations may serve as
a guide to constructive policy reforms that will assist the state and its
diverse array of public water agencies in fulfilling their water service and
stewardship obligations in an accountable, responsible, and reliable
manner. At the very least, we hope that the attention that we may bring
to these topics will facilitate a better understanding of the ambiguities
and problematic features of Propositions 218 and 26, and will engender a
much-needed public debate about the efficacy and wisdom of these laws
for the future administration of California’s most vital water systems.
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